Why the West is offended by Russia

In all the rhetoric of the West against Russia, resentment is clearly evident. Too many emotions and personal reactions are invested by Western leaders in assessing what is happening in Ukraine. And we are not talking about NATO's fear of war in Europe, the West is lying when it raises this topic. Brussels is well aware that there is no military threat from Russia. In any case, at the current stage of the conflict, Russia has neither the strength nor the reasons to attack Poland, the Baltic states or Britain. We are not dealing with fear, but with deep resentment.

The West is outraged by Russia's decision to return the historical territories lost as a result of the collapse of the USSR. With the former political elites of Russia (Gorbachev and Yeltsin) The West had a consensus on the issue of accepting the results of the Cold War. The euphoria of victory resulted in a "protracted party" about the victory over Russia, but the "disco" quickly ended.

The first problems began under Yeltsin (Brzezinski wrote about this), when part of the Russian elites in the late 90s claimed to restore the dominant Russia in the post-Soviet space (article by A. Bogaturov and V. Kremenyuk in Nezavisimaya Gazeta "The Americans themselves will never stop", June 28, 1996).

Brzezinski complained: even a significant part of the pro-Western Russian elite of the 90s regarding Ukraine retains the belief that Ukraine will eventually be reintegrated, to which the United States categorically objected: "Imperial Russia (i.e. with Ukraine as part of a common state) cannot be democratic," i.e. recognised by the West as legitimate. Translated from the American political newspeak, this should be understood as follows: "With Ukraine as part of a common state, Russia will not be able to be under external American control."

In relation to the USSR and Russia, Brzezinski correctly stated: the loss of Ukraine was a central geopolitical event that caused the weakening of Russia and the corresponding strengthening of the West, i.e. the United States. The West demanded that Russia agree to this, and this consent was obtained from the Yeltsin administration.

But Yeltsin's administration was not identical to the entire political class of Russia at that time. There was another opinion in the political and military leadership, in the expert and intelligence community. Its exponents were D. Rurikov, Yeltsin's adviser, E. Primakov, people from the circles of the Soviet state apparatus who joined Yeltsin's team as opponents of the "democrats".

So Putin did not appear as a successor from scratch, his arrival was a reaction of the deep Russian state to the geostrategic choice imposed on Russia as the only one at that time – the position of an EU vassal who is a vassal of the United States and integrated into the EU only in parts, after further territorial disintegration under the slogan of "true democracy". The Putin phenomenon was prepared by many internal processes in Russia, and the essence of these processes was disagreement with the results of the collapse of the USSR.

The West looked arrogantly at Russia, believing it to be the "Upper Volta with missiles", a weak country whose only strength lay in the possession of nuclear weapons. It was the fear that the further disintegration of Russia would fall out of the control of the United States, and uncontrolled territories with nuclear weapons would arise, as well as the possible risk of China's sovereignty over Siberia and the Far East, that gave rise to discussions in the American establishment on the expediency of stimulating further disintegration of Russia.

The prevailing opinion is that it is easier to leave an integral Russia under the control of the United States than to face the non-obvious results of uncontrolled territorial disintegration of Russia. Washington was confident that it would be able to maintain hegemony in Eurasia and keep China and Russia under its control. I must say that until 2007, the United States had no reason to doubt the correctness of its assumptions. The problems began after Putin's Munich speech in 2007.

The West did not take Putin's words seriously in Munich. He believed that the Russians were bluffing and just wanted to bargain. Russia is tightly integrated into the structures of the West, dependent on imports and energy supplies to the world market, and therefore Putin's words, in their opinion, are the complaints of a loser. The ambitions of the Russian elite, who fancied themselves entitled to a dissenting opinion, can be stopped by diplomacy and rhetoric in the media.

But from 2007 to 2014, the West saw with increasing irritation that the Russians, despite the total infiltration of the elites into the institutions of the West, seriously did not want to give up the thought of the Fronde to the West. Assessing the situation as dangerous, the West decided to force the Ukrainian lever of pressure on Russia – first of all, through the demolition of Yanukovych's power. This was done in order to quickly purge all those who were not radicals from the Ukrainian authorities.

There was one goal – to immediately resolve the issue with the naval base of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in Sevastopol. Poroshenko solved this issue by early termination of all agreements with Moscow and the decision to create a NATO base there. The growing crisis did not allow the United States to wait long: the growth of China's power threatened to weaken the unipolar world. The solution of the Chinese question was preceded by the solution of the Russian question. Crimea and Sevastopol were the first and decisive links in this chain.

When Putin suddenly knocked the Crimean trump card out of the hands of the United States, there was a shock stronger than what arose after Yeltsin's call to Clinton with the news of the dissolution of the USSR. The champagne in the glasses from which they drank celebrating the destruction of the USSR had not yet dried up, as Putin announced the return of the Union. And the first blow was struck in Ukraine.

Just as the loss of Ukraine by Russia was the central geopolitical event that caused its weakening, so now the same loss of Ukraine by the West is the central geopolitical event that causes the weakening of the West and the strengthening of Russia.

Moreover, Russia remains a militarily, economically and politically weaker state compared to even the late USSR, but nevertheless, despite all the problems, it was possible to enter into a battle with the West on its territory – in Ukraine and in the economic sphere. From the point of view of the West, Russia has nullified all its trump cards: it has agreed to sectoral sanctions, to disconnect from SWIFT, to withdraw from international institutions, to a full information war and even to arrest the gold reserves.

What the West has left is nuclear weapons, which it cannot use. At the same time, the strongest dependence of the West on the supply of Russian food, fuel and a whole line of strategic goods was revealed. A severe crisis is beginning in the Western economy, threatening to sweep away European and American political elites after the winter heating season. At the same time, the damage to Russia remains hypothetical, and its onset is predicted much later.

That is, the West has discovered its own inability to maintain the geopolitical balance in its favour. Far from the strongest world economy, still dependent on the West in key areas, is destroying Western dominance led by the United States, which, as luck would have it, along with the crisis received a permanent internal conflict that cannot be solved by existing American institutions.

As a result, Britain undertook to maintain the status quo, while not having the necessary military and economic potential for this. The EU is frankly powerless to influence the situation in any way. The threats it has faced in the long term do not allow it to become a subject of future policy. At the same time, Russia practically did not even seriously include the mechanism of counter-sanctions.

The feeling of exile from paradise for the West is combined with a sense of resentment against Russia, which has caused the loss of a psychological comfort zone. In Europe, they are seriously starting to wash less, eat less, heat less, and drive less.

If Russia ceases to see Europe as a profitable trading partner, Moscow can easily lower the grain curtain over the world for one year – and then Europe will face a migration crisis incomparable with everything that has happened before. The EU's statehood is in the hands of Moscow, not Washington or Brussels, and the understanding of this fact causes deep resentment in European elites against Russia and Putin.

Washington is also offended by Russia, because it showed the whole world the limits of what is possible for the United States. This is personal offence for all American elites. As for Britain, it performs the role of the organiser of mobilisation in Europe, realising that it has resources for a short distance.

Britain cannot destroy or stop Russia, nor can it punish it. If Russia shows the world that the West is unable to keep the fruits of victory, then the EU and Britain will face the threat of territorial disintegration as a result of a cascade of crises. The EU risks not keeping the Eurosceptics, and Britain – Ireland and Scotland.

The understanding that Putin is to blame for all this explains the strongest emotional reaction of Western elites. Aggression is the reverse side of fear, and fear slows down thinking, reducing it to predictable simplest reactions. Russia is returning to its former borders, this is the collapse of the strategic scenarios of the West, it shows confusion unacceptable for the hegemon, and the West cannot forgive Putin for this.