Batyr at the crossroads: where will Kazakhstan go?
In January, Kazakhstan experienced tragic events that some experts call an attempted coup d'etat, others - a "colour revolution". They agree on one thing: for Kazakhstan, this is only the beginning, past events are only the initial impulse, we will see the wave raised by them later.
As in the case of forecasting natural disasters, the same tsunami, knowing the repeatability of the processes of the same phenomenon, it is possible to calculate the consequences.
For the state, these are: the attitude of society to the system of state power; the attitude of the majority to the obligations of the state to society; interethnic harmony; social justice; the position of the people on attracting external assistance; interstate relations.
Let's start with the last one. Prior to the January events of this year, Kazakhstan followed a multi-vector policy. The main vectors were relations: with the countries of Europe (Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany); Islamic world (Turkey, Pakistan, UAE, Qatar, Iran); Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan); USA; China; Russia.
Only Russia and Kyrgyzstan took part in resolving the situation in Kazakhstan from the listed countries. The latter, like Belarus, participated indirectly by providing a contingent to the peacekeeping forces.
With the withdrawal of the contingent, Kazakhstan had to decide on the question "who is a friend and who is just a comrade”. It would be logical to assume that the vector of relations with Russia should strengthen, and with other countries - on the contrary, weaken.
Almost everything happened the other way around. Based on the analysis of open sources, the last interstate negotiations with Russia were held on January 12, 2022 (President K. J. Tokayev received CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas). After that, contact with Russia was not noticed in the public field.
But conducted by the first person of the state (K. J. Tokayev):
On January 24 - meeting with President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev. On the same day - with the President of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov.
On January 25, Tokayev took part in the Central Asia-China summit of heads of state;
On January 27 - at the summit of heads of state "Central Asia-India".
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan participated (conducted):
On January 11, 2022, at the initiative of the current Chairman of the Organisation of Turkic States, an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation;
On January 13, 2022, at the initiative of the Kuwaiti side - a telephone conversation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan M. Tileuberdi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait Ahmed Nasser Al-Mohammad Al-Sabah;
On January 19, 2022, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Ye. Alimbayev held a meeting with British Ambassador Kathy Leach;
On January 26, 2022, at the initiative of the Pakistani side - a telephone conversation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan M. Tileuberdi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Hussain Qureshi;
On January 31, 2022, at the initiative of the Secretariat of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi had a telephone conversation with OIC Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha;
On January 31, 2022, Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi held a meeting with Secretary General of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) Baghdad Amreyev during his working visit to Nur-Sultan.
There is a trend in the development of Kazakhstan's relations with Islamic states, Great Britain, China and India. It should be assumed that if the United Kingdom is present, then we can talk about Kazakhstan's ties with Turkey, since the latter has been a conductor of Britain's interests in the region for many years.
Russia, the CSTO, and the Eurasian Economic Community are not on this list, which looks very strange. It turns out that the vector of both the country that provided assistance and the organisation associated with it, on the contrary, has decreased.
Turning to the widespread beliefs among the people of the country on the issue of attracting external assistance, it is necessary to take into account the scandals of the last two years that took place in the Kazakh information field.
They relate to the speeches of a number of Russian personalities (Fedorov, Nikonov, Spitsyn), on the history of the formation of Kazakhstan, the policy of using the Kazakh and Russian languages, and Kazakh opponents (Narymbai, Ältaev, Mukhamedzhanov, Serkpaev).
Among the Kazakh segment, the idea of Russia's intention to annex Kazakhstan, the uselessness of the Russian language, Russians as agents of the Kremlin on the territory of Kazakhstan, and Russia's bad faith regarding Kazakhstan's economic privileges within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community was clearly promoted as a white thread.
If we look at the content of most of the Facebook messages, Telegrams, and others from January 5 to 11, we can see the further development of the ideas shown above. This was expressed in the fact that the Russians were directly told that they were spies, and they were forced to prove their innocence by knowing the Kazakh language and supporting nationalists.
It seems that such ideas were lobbied in the interests of those who maintain various NGOs in Kazakhstan. Recall their number: more than 22,000 as of 2021. Approximately 200 of them receive foreign funding. Among the beneficiaries are the United States and Turkey. Funded activities and projects allow us to draw conclusions about their goals: This is undermining Russia's position in Central Asia, promoting pro-Turkic and Western views and ideals.
Let's give an example: while the Russian peacekeeping contingent was in Kazakhstan, the slogans "Ivan go home, there is no vodka here!", "information" about the beatings of peaceful protesters by Russian peacekeepers, provocative calls (allegedly from Russians living in the northern and central regions of Kazakhstan) to create self-defence units with a further declaration of independence and annexation in Russia began to spread actively online.
Naturally, some Kazakhs believed this and still believe it. This is compounded by the general nihilism and Western stereotypes regarding Russia's foreign policy. We will also mention the strange silence of the country's leadership about the mass spread of such sentiments. Over the past 5 years, there has been only one speech by the First Deputy President of Kazakhstan, D. Abayev, about "cave nationalism". Other facts were ignored.
In the issues of social justice and a meritocratic society, promised by K. J. Tokayev, there are also a lot of questions. The President of the country has repeatedly stated that many oligarchs illegally enriched themselves, this will be stopped, the money will go to the people. Even a meeting was held under his leadership with representatives of the domestic big business. As a result, the fund "Kazakhstan Khylkyna" (to the People of Kazakhstan) was established, to which about 12.5 billion tenge was transferred.
Taking into account the number of Kazakhstanis in about 19 million people, it turns out that each of its inhabitants accounts for about 700 tenge (just over 100 rubles). You can't fix your situation with that kind of money. Moreover, since the fund's revenues have stopped, there are no guarantees that they will be on a permanent basis, as well as guarantees that the money will be used specifically for the needs of the population.
In part, the situation could be improved through nationalisation, or the return of control over extractive enterprises (which are the majority in Kazakhstan). Currently, most of them are controlled by foreign companies.
Moreover, the share of the presence of Chinese, European (as well as the United States), and Turkish companies is increasing, while the share of Russian companies is steadily decreasing. But even here, even after high-profile scandals related to the attempt to sell hydroelectric power plants in the UAE, information appeared that state-owned strategic assets of KazMunayGas and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (an analog of Russian Railways) are planning to transfer to private hands.
It turns out that even with the constant payments of money by the oligarchs in favour of the people, in the amount in which they give this money, they simply will not be enough even to meet the minimum needs. They certainly won't be able to improve their well-being. The process of transferring state corporations into private hands also does not inspire confidence in a bright future for an ordinary citizen of Kazakhstan.
Major political reforms and state reconstruction are not announced by the leadership of Kazakhstan. What it did in the first place was to strengthen the armed forces. Thus, special operations forces were created in the Ministry of Defence, headed by B. Zhurabayev, a career intelligence officer and veteran of armed conflicts.
The issue of supplying the armed forces with new military equipment and weapons is raised. It is necessary to focus on this point, since much will depend on who Kazakhstan will buy everything it needs from. At a minimum, this will indicate the strategic priority of the state. Time will tell whether it will be Russia, Turkey, China or the United States.
The specifics of popular unrest showed their difference in the regions of Kazakhstan: if they were quite aggressive and numerous in the south and west of the country, this cannot be attributed to the centre and north of Kazakhstan. The trends shown are not only caused by unrest, but also by the peculiarities of the language, traditions, and mentality. The composition of a unitary state does not take into account these features. A possible solution would be to transform the country into a federation consisting of three subjects: north, south and west.
Ensuring that all citizens have access to public service, not just a select few, is crucial. Ensure a proportionate presence and on a national basis.
I think it is no secret that corruption and nepotism, which arose on the basis of the peculiarities of the national structure, namely, the division into zhuzs, are clearly manifested in Kazakhstan. And what is decided "at the top" is not always correctly implemented on the ground. A possible solution would be to borrow the people's control system from China, where the government has a Ministry of Control and a Ministry of Supervision.
In any case, we don't hear anything about such reforms. The current president promised to develop reforms and take concrete steps by September. Given that not only the people will be waiting for this moment, but also the beneficiaries who "overslept" the attempted revolution, if they do not, they will find a way out of the situation, then the country will face a second wave of revolution. At the same time, numerous NGOs, agents of influence, and possibly "sleeping cells" of radicals will be involved in the process by this time.
It is not possible to predict one scenario for the development of the situation. In this regard, we will highlight the most possible options.
Scenario one: Russian
Kazakhstan initiates rapprochement with the Russian Federation. Purchases of weapons and military equipment for the modernisation of the existing fleet of combat vehicles will begin. Branches of Russian educational institutions, not only higher education, will be opened in the country.
Russian will have the status of a second state language. Relations within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union will be deepened, as will the priority of Russian companies as opposed to Western and Eastern ones in the extractive and processing industries, and the creation of joint ventures.
In this scenario, based on the public sentiment shown earlier, there may be open dissatisfaction with the actions of the country's leadership, which will be fuelled by Russia's opponents.
Russia's active intervention will inevitably lead to increased pressure on the territory of the Middle zhuz (exactly the centre, north and east of the country), where Russified Kazakhs and ethnic Russians predominate. After the dissolution of the parliament, voiced by Tokayev, activists with radical Russophobic views who oppose the “occupiers" may come to power in it. We already see certain prerequisites in the person of Karin and Umarov. In the future, this may turn into a civil war, similar to Ukraine.
The United States, Britain, and Turkey will play a particularly active role in this process. In the medium term, it will be possible to find a balance between the interests of all countries in the region, since none of them needs Kazakhstan as a hotbed of terrorism.
A possible solution may be to convert a unitary structure into a federal one. The creation of the union state of Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan.
Scenario two: Eastern
Here, a rapprochement with China, or China and Iran at the same time, is possible. Certain shifts in this direction are visible, including the negotiation processes with these powers, an increase in the presence of Chinese companies in the country (uranium, precious metal mining).
Kazakhstan is important for China to continue its "One Belt" strategy as a transport corridor. It is equally important for the implementation of nuclear initiatives and ensuring security in the Xinjiang Uygur region.
For Russia, this is a more acceptable option from the point of view of ensuring the security of the southern borders. Here we can trace the connection of our interests with the interests of China. There will also be a gradual ousting of the West from all spheres of life in Kazakhstan.
There are also disadvantages, one of the main ones is that the Slavs, after the January events, and also in view of the weakening of the Kremlin's position, will start to leave Kazakhstan en masse. Even in the short term, this can transform the country into a mono-ethnic state, at least a state with an overwhelming majority of Turkic peoples. A side negative effect will be radicalisation.
Christianity is a certain balance of religions, and with the departure of the Russians, the counterweight will cease to exist, Islam will take its place as the predominant religion. This will also be reflected in their culture and values. Everything that was previously focused on the Russian world will be reoriented to the culture of China, Iran, and possibly other Eastern countries. In any case, Russia's capabilities in the region will be limited.
Scenario three: Turkish
Instead of China, Iran or Russia, Britain and Turkey can act as a tandem. The former has its own long-standing economic interests in Kazakhstan, as well as increased appetites for the possibility of influence in the region. In this regard, Turkey is a permanent and long-standing partner of the United Kingdom. Both countries are closely linked to NATO.
Expansion of cooperation is possible in the field of education, supply of weapons and military equipment, and raw materials. As a result, Kazakhstan can be used as a support base for NATO to influence Russia, China, and the region as a whole. The pro-Turkish lobby in Kazakhstan is quite strong. Some experts speak of a Turkish footprint in the January events. Therefore, the development in this direction should not be discounted.
Scenario four: leave everything as it is
In this case, after the failure of the country's leadership to fulfil its obligations, the opposition will "wake up", supported not only by NGOs, the West, Turkey, but also by the people themselves. Then there will only be a civil war with the transition to the first, second or third option. It is not necessary to count on the fact that "everything will return to normal".
Both the elite, which has been removed from the leadership, and the states interested in weakening Russia and China will intervene here. It is difficult to name the best period for them to implement their plans: the people, having already tasted the revolution, will not refuse to repeat it, especially if the president of the country does not fulfil his promises.
It is difficult to name the priority of scenarios; there are few grounds for this, which speak of an unambiguous choice of K. J. Tokayev's ways of development. It is clear that the President of Kazakhstan Tokayev has not yet decided on a choice. The result is still not far off: it is indicated in September of this year, when the management will either leave everything as it is, or move on to the implementation of one of the scenarios.