Why do RAND experts advise the Pentagon to increase unpredictability?
A group of experts from the RAND Corporation recently made a proposal to the leadership of the US armed forces to think about how to increase their operational unpredictability, thereby strengthening the deterrence of Russia and China. This appeal did not arise out of nowhere, but as a reaction (according to the RAND experts themselves) to certain "opinions in US political circles". The representatives of these opinions considered that the United States is too transparent for China and Russia and can strengthen the deterrence of these countries in their desire to attack American allies, becoming more unpredictable.
The implementation of the order of these "certain circles" passed through the military department, after which the expert group developed, as the authors write, four approaches to increasing operational unpredictability. The authors relied on "publicly available information about the capabilities of the Chinese and Russian intelligence services" and the forecasting methods used by them. That is, no closed information that could highlight the methods of American intelligence work was used – because the report was open.
American RAND experts have proposed the following approaches to increasing the operational unpredictability of the American armed forces.
1. Use irregular deployment schemes. This means using schemes where it is difficult to calculate the deployment time due to the presence of non – obvious options-combined, of course, with an enhanced secrecy regime and active means of disinformation. That is, use the time factor.
2. Demonstrative demonstration of the ability to use different deployment options – so that the enemy refrains from attacking, knowing that a large amount of computational work will have to be done, where all the results have questionable reliability. As a result, the enemy will overexert their forces, not knowing where and how the Americans will react, and try to control more directions than necessary.
3. A bluff strategy with a demonstration of the ability to act in more directions than there really is. This is the work of intelligence services to disinform the enemy, when they introduce false options or overestimate the possibilities. In fact, this is a version of paragraph 2.
4. Explore hidden opportunities where you can reduce the time for various mobilisation activities. China and Russia will put incorrect data in the calculations of the speed of the US response. As a result, the US’ opponents will be overcome with doubts, and they will refrain from attacking.
Americans are trying to understand how effective the proposed measures will be. RAND experts warn in advance that their proposals will entail serious costs, and there will be a need to be prepared for this. It is recognised that the intelligence services of China and Russia can predict in advance where and how the US will deploy forces, and the number of these forces for the success of the strategy must be significant. That is, the strategy does not work in local conflicts.
The uncertainty, according to RAND experts, will force China and Russia to assess the risks as higher and lead to the conclusion that they have abandoned the intentions of the attack. However, it is not known how the US opponents actually make decisions. It is possible that the deception will not succeed. RAND believes that Russia is inclined to overestimate the capabilities of the United States due to the lack of information sources in the US governments and their allies. China has informants there and therefore can better verify the information.
Nevertheless, Russia and China have sophisticated verification capabilities, and therefore it is necessary to carry out a set of major changes in American mobilisation and deployment programs. RAND estimates the probability of misleading China and Russia with its advice on all four points as low or moderate.
To increase the effect, they need new ways of interaction at the headquarters level, increased logistical capabilities (increased flexibility and manoeuvrability), numerous exercises combined with increased counterintelligence cover and disinformation for opponents.
This will be expensive, and investments will be required to change the US military potential. Low-cost measures will also have a low effect.
At the same time, the risk of increasing unpredictability is also recognised. There may be side effects in the form of mistakes in the actions of the United States or increased anxiety in China and Russia.
RAND's recommendations are simple: compare what is currently being used to ensure unpredictability with alternative options, strengthen the work with information, including intelligence activity, study the trade-offs between what is desired and possible, increase the flexibility and manoeuvrability of the US army.
What should one pay attention to in this, as they say now, case?
First. There is an acute internal struggle in US political circles, during which groups associated with the military-industrial complex are trying to justify an increase in investments in the military sphere. To do this, they need to justify the adoption of certain large-scale projects, which are possible only if a serious threat is recognised.
A group of experts from the RAND Corporation was hired to formulate such a threat and develop such a project, which prepared a corresponding report. That is, we are dealing with a struggle to preserve the subjectivity of circles traditionally associated with the Republican Party, which is being squeezed by the Democrats.
Second. The measures proposed by RAND experts from the point of view of military effectiveness look obviously problematic. The program is extremely vulnerable from all positions: from the point of view of assessing the capabilities of the intelligence services of Russia and China, from the point of view of modelling their responses, even from the point of view of the possibility of such situations in reality. As they say, what is original here is not new, and what is new is not original.
To reduce everything to recommendations in order to do an organisational revolution in the US army and strengthen intelligence work is not something fundamentally new and serious, simply due to the lack of real opportunities to implement these recommendations. Everything that could be done has already been done, and what is not done rests on the natural limits of the capabilities of technology and organisation. RAND experts hardly know the case better than the specialists of the Pentagon and the CIA.
In addition, there is no analysis of the possible reactions of China and Russia to the increase in the operational unpredictability of the United States. Due to the specifics of American military science, in it there is no concept of operational art, which is a link between tactics and strategy. But in the United States, they still plan operations (they are called "small strategy", but the essence does not change), and therefore they know that no matter how much uncertainty increases, any headquarters will always calculate all the possibilities and options for mobilising and reacting to the enemy.
To do this, one doesn’t need to have agents in the US government. Stalin had no agents in Hitler's entourage, but he knew about the plans of Barbarossa and the Citadel almost earlier than many generals of the Wehrmacht and the OKW. Needless to say, now the capabilities of the general staffs of Russia and China are much higher than before the war.
China and Russia, assessing the situation as threatening, but uncertain, are likely to go not to abandon their intentions, but to take a proactive action. And this entails unacceptable risks for the United States itself about the possibility of being in a situation of escalation of an out-of-control conflict. It is easy to increase the degree of uncertainty in military affairs, but countries that understand what nuclear strategic parity and global security are, deliberately refuse a certain degree of opacity.
Moreover, the very attempts to increase opacity are assessed as a real preparation for war, which requires real retaliatory actions. The desire for unpredictability is understood by the headquarters as a path to war, which is not included in the Grand Strategy of nuclear superpowers. They intend to blackmail each other with a threat, but not use it in reality.
Increasing unpredictability is the best way to a real and sudden nuclear war, since the response to a local threat will immediately be transferred to a higher level of response – it will already be global. The recommendations of the RAND experts do not take this into account in any way, which makes the report a fulfilment of a political order, reducing its practical value for the military.
Third. Such a level of research carried out by the highest-ranking analytical corporation in the United States raises suspicions of a significant decrease in the quality of the American analytical community. This is no longer military science, but lobbying. The readiness is demonstrated to pull from thin air recommendations and threats.
If the same degradation of the professional community is observed in the US law enforcement bodies, then this is an extremely alarming phenomenon. Or we can talk about a certain degradation of the expert (and administrative) corps of the RAND corporation itself.
Fourth. The RAND recommendations may well fit into the US plans to organise a local war in Taiwan for China. If this is considered as an operation, then everything that the RAND experts suggest looks logical and natural. But it is unlikely that the Pentagon does not do all this without the recommendations of RAND. All this lies on the surface and is by no means a revelation for the officers of the operational departments of the headquarters.
Fifth (and most important). The United States demonstrates the exhaustion of means and methods of deterring China and Russia, and therefore their experts are sophisticated in inventing some serious-looking recipes, which in fact are not at all what they are presented. The politicians initiating the report are actually trying to increase their weight and remain in the elites. The military-industrial complex and experts are trying to earn money. The intelligence community – to increase its importance. This is what is called the "deep state” in the United States.
In principle, the army leadership does not object to anything that increases their importance. But everything that concerns the restructuring of the rolled-up management technologies will definitely not be applied. For the army, these experiments mean chaos and loss of control. Therefore, what will be done is not what the experts write, but what the generals want.
Unfortunately, it will not be possible to increase the unpredictability of the United States. This country is extremely predictable even when it decides to start fighting for unpredictability. Apparently, the United States no longer has any other relatively safe methods against its rivals.