Afghanistan as a factor of the Russian strategy
The change of power in Afghanistan, which occurred as a result of the rapid departure of the United States and the even more rapid arrival of the Taliban, forces Russia to reconsider its strategy in Middle and Central Asia.
The previous one was expectant and reactive. It proceeded from the fact that the balance of forces in the region over the 20 years of the US’ presence in Afghanistan has developed, is stable and it is necessary to adapt to it, and attempts to actively play for its change are unproductive. The maximum possible was to create the EAEU economic union and the CSTO military union. All these measures did not exclude the multi-vector nature of the Central Asian states, but allowed Russia to be present on the border with Afghanistan and develop integration, combining it with the Chinese Belt and Road project.
The new strategy associated with the power vacuum created by the US’ withdrawal requires active influence, otherwise other players will seize the initiative, and Russia will lose the coming 20 years. The threat of Central Asia being destabilised gives Russia a unique chance to promote deeper integration and strengthen its influence on local political elites.
The Afghan Taliban found themselves in a situation similar to the one of the Bolsheviks after the October revolution of 1917. They need to stop the war, neutralise the Panjshir resistance of the Northern Alliance, reset the factor of Afghan emigration to the United States and focus on solving internal socio-economic and socio-political problems. This is a condition for the international recognition of the Taliban.
The Afghan Taliban is an armed anti-government opposition that came to power in a situation of a long-term civil war waged with the active participation of foreign powers. The nature of the war is not class and estate, but religious-ethnic and inter-tribal. It is the tribal identification in Afghanistan that is the main criterion of "friend-foe", making any compromise temporary. Even the Pashtun majority is unable to achieve the submission of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara enclaves.
The Taliban's need for a pause and recognition by the international community pushes their leaders to declare a course of reconciliation and amnesty, but its implementation contradicts the course of consolidating power and suppressing resistance. The United States is beginning to force the Afghan opposition to carry out street protests in the hope of forceful suppression, which will give rise to military strikes against the structures of the Taliban. Thus, Washington is trying to regain the lost trump cards and compensate for the image damage.
The Taliban will clear the internal space from agents of influence and opposition, the limits of permissible repression are still unclear to them and will be determined by experience. The external influence of the West will be aimed at maximising the reduction of the repressive potential of the Taliban, which will reduce their power resource.
The Taliban's foreign policy will be aimed at building balanced relations with Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the Arab world, China and Russia. These are diverse political vectors, and the Taliban receive both freedom of manoeuvre between forces and political risks associated with a conflict of interests of external players.
One of the serious problems of the Taliban is relations with Turkey. The Taliban stated that they would need Turkey's help to rebuild the country. We are talking about various plans for the development of the Istanbul-Tehran-Islamabad container railway line, which has been in existence since 2009, but is weak due to the lack of electrification and terminals.
But when it comes time to raise the issue of the Turkish presence at the Kabul airport, Afghanistan's relations with this US satellite in NATO may worsen. The Taliban will not tolerate the lack of control over any piece of the country's territory, and Erdogan may face the threat of leaving Afghanistan associated with a "loss of face", following the example of Biden. And leaving, perceived as a defeat, may cost Erdogan the loss of power and the collapse of the neo-Ottoman project.
Pakistan is falling into a diplomatic trap in its relations with Afghanistan. The United States is very tempted to blame Pakistan for its defeat and punish it with sanctions. This will completely change the balance of power in the region from China to India, as it will provoke a deepening of the alliance of Pakistan with China. But also Pakistan can't refuse to support the Taliban.
If Pakistan finally enters the sphere of influence of China, then a cluster will arise focused on a confrontation with the United States - including Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as well as Russia affiliated with Central Asia. If we add Syria to this, the appearance of such a cluster will mean a colossal defeat for the United States in Eurasia. The reciprocal strengthening of US ties with India will only strengthen anti-American tendencies in Central Asia.
But India itself will seek to strengthen in Afghanistan in spite of Pakistan and China, and therefore the US’ influence on India will be limited. If such a distribution of forces occurs, the US will fall into a position of weakness, which will force them to either escalate in Taiwan, at the risk of provoking the collapse of local democrats affiliated with them there, or accepting the division of the world into three clusters - American, Chinese and Russian adjacent to the Chinese, and making every effort to consolidate the remaining allies - primarily the EU, Turkey, Arab countries, Israel, Australia, Canada, Vietnam, Latin America and some African countries.
The loss of dominance in Eurasia will call into question the status of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. The response to these threats will be the US forcing the military aspect of the confrontation, where the stakes will be raised as much as possible, and the climate and environmental agenda will form the basis of the strategy of economic strangulation of American opponents.
The Sino-Russian response will be the formation of a zone of the yuan and the ruble, an exit from the dollar zone and the formation of trade routes protected from NATO and passing through the territory of Central Asia, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan to India – with access to the Mediterranean. Chinese projects in Cuba and Nicaragua will be activated. China's military presence in Cuba will counterbalance the Taiwanese threat. The resumption of the construction of the Nicaraguan canal will strengthen Venezuela and create another anti-American cluster in the US backyard.
The agreements between Russia and the Taliban on guarantees of peace in Central Asia are temporary and limited by the period of strengthening the Taliban in power. It is known that the Taliban's agent network in Central Asia has been built for a long time and is mostly built. The cells are dormant, and if necessary, they will not only be activated, but also multiplied in number.
It will be possible to restrain the expansion of the Taliban into Central Asia only if Afghanistan is involved in the Eurasian integration project under the auspices of China, Iran, Pakistan, India (despite the difficulties of Delhi with Islamabad) and Russia. Turkey will promote its expansion in Central Asia, but it will have to face competition with the Taliban. They will fight for Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz and Uighurs. It is on this competition that China, Britain, the United States, Russia, Pakistan and India will try to play. Kazakhstan will try to maintain its neutrality, especially given its ties with the United States, the EU, China and Britain.
Moscow is involved in the Afghan case not in order to increase its authority in the eyes of the EU as a peacemaker, but as a rival of NATO. Russia does not need peace for the sake of peace or for the sake of respect from the EU. Russia is interested in peace concluded on favourable terms, and these conditions do not coincide with the interests of the EU.
The fact that the EU is primarily interested in peace in all important regions is a myth. Peace is always in favour of one side or another, this is the result of victory in a physical confrontation, which means that Russia and the EU will fight for peace in different ways. The EU and the US will try to weaken the logistics capabilities of Russia and China, and Russia will strengthen them. The gain of one side will always be a loss for the other.
There will be a struggle for control over drug trafficking. The fact that the Taliban have declared that they will now eradicate the drug trade does not mean that it will be so. Drug trafficking is a powerful bargaining chip of the Taliban, which they will not give up in any case. They will try to exchange any restrictions in this area for various concessions from all interested parties.
With their coming to power, the Taliban no longer needs intermediaries. The Taliban has become a real party to the negotiations. Anyone who is late with the recognition of the Taliban will miss many opportunities to influence its policy. That is why there is a possibility that China will take advantage of the situation and be one of the first to recognise the Taliban.
Already, the Taliban's press secretary Suhail Shaheen has done an exclusive interview with the Chinese CGTN, and Wang Yiwei, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the People's University of China, calls the Taliban the liberation Army and accuses the United States of demonising the Taliban. Knowing the political system of China, we can say that this is how the official opinion of the Chinese authorities is broadcast, but there is no opportunity for a more open assessment yet.
The Taliban has an equal relationship with Russia, since the Taliban need Russia's help against ISIS. The Taliban can receive this assistance only from Russia and Iran. The Taliban understand that Turkey occupies an ambivalent position on the issue of ISIS. The condition for reducing their support for ISIS will be the consent of the Taliban to expand into Central Asia and China (Xinjiang). Then, for the Taliban, a conflict with Pakistan, Iran and Russia is inevitable, and, as they become involved in activity in Xinjiang - with China.
The Taliban understand that if they agree, then they will be forced into an alliance with ISIS, and this will end in dual power in Afghanistan – with the subsequent defeat of the Taliban and its replacement with ISIS. In this situation, ISIS and its sponsors are the natural enemies of the Taliban.
The refusal to support Al-Qaeda is a condition for recognising the Taliban from the US side. This condition was put forward by Trump and has now lost its relevance. Previously, the Taliban did not agree to this on principle, and now there is no need for this at all.
The pandemic factor in the Afghan case is important, but not decisive. In the East, human life does not matter as much as in Europe and the United States. Afghanistan does not strive for progress at any cost, tribal strife does not allow Afghanistan to turn into a fully-fledged state. The Pashtuns are not able to become a state-forming nation, and Islam does not play the integrating role that Christianity played in Russia or in Europe.
At the same time, the states of Central Asia have gone much further ahead in state-building than Afghanistan. The protection of this statehood is available only to Russia. The more dangerous the situation, the more susceptible the Central Asian elites are to the conditions of Russian protection. In this regard, the increase in risk is to a certain extent beneficial to Russia, since its influence on the composition of elites and political institutions is increasing. This influence is carried out both directly and through the EAEU and the CSTO.
One of the main vectors for Russia is the confrontation with the intelligence services of NATO countries in Central Asia. The Taliban will not head for jihad in Russia, but they will not refuse to penetrate into Central Asia.
In addition to drug trafficking and the export of jihad, Russia is concerned about the uncontrolled flow of migrants from Afghanistan to Central Asia, since extremists come with them and foment war, and then they enter Russia together with refugees.
That is precisely why Russia's strategy in this region should change to a proactive one. It should reorient itself from avoiding conflict to its controlled use. And having started in Afghanistan, Russian strategic activity will inevitably spread both within the framework of the EAEU and outside of this framework.
It is possible to predict an increase in the importance of the SCO, the EAEU and the CSTO format. As the conflict between China and the United States deepens, Central Asia will be shaped as a zone of competition for all global projects. The region is turning into the Asian Balkans, where the interests of superpowers collide, and the risks of war push for the formation of new alliances and the destruction of old ones.