How big is the loss of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant for Ukraine?

    For Russia, the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant is of interest as a means of providing electricity to the liberated territories
    access_time28 May 2022
    print 28 5 2022
     

    Along with other large and even strategic facilities, such as the ports of Berdyansk, Mariupol and Kherson, during Operation "Z" in the first days of March, the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant was taken under control. On May 18, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Marat Khusnullin told the media that the Nuclear Power Plant will work in the interests of Ukraine if the Kiev regime is ready to accept and pay for the electricity produced at the Nuclear Power Plant. Otherwise, the Nuclear Power Plant will start working in the interests of Russia.

    The Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant located in Energodar is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe by installed capacity (6000 MW). In fact, the "nationalisation" announced by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation could not but affect the energy balance of Ukraine and Russia - especially in the part of the liberated territories that need energy.

    "Atomic" portrait of Ukrainian electricity

    Until March 2022, four nuclear power plants operated in Ukraine, with different numbers of units, types of reactors and, accordingly, levels of production. These are the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant – 6 VVER-1000 type reactors each with 1000 MW of capacity, the Rovno Nuclear Power Plant – 2 VVER-440 and 2 VVER-1000, giving together 2835 MW, the Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant – 2 working units with VVER-1000 (2000 MW) and the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant – four VVER-1000, one of which is mothballed, the total capacity is 3000 MW.

    The nominal capacity of Ukrainian nuclear power plants is 13,835 MW, the real productivity is noticeably lower: in 2017, the total capacity of the Nuclear Power Plant was 13,107 MW.

    As a rule, the share of nuclear power plants in the Ukrainian energy balance was about half of the total volume, but in recent months it has been growing strongly. By the end of 2021, the share of electricity generation at nuclear power plants was 55.1%, in 2020 – 51.2%. Thermal generation "slipped" strongly – 29.3% instead of 35.2%, hydropower increased – 6.7% instead of 5.1%), alternative energy sources showed growth – 8% instead of 7.3%.

    It is quite obvious that the structure of Ukrainian energy was influenced by the prices of hydrocarbons and their availability. The rising cost of gas and oil, as well as a significant decrease in the supply of coal, forced the Ukrainian government to look for alternatives in the form of a backlog of hydro and nuclear power plants left over from Soviet times.

    On January 30, Ukrainian Energoatom reported that for the first time in history it had put all 15 Nuclear Power Plant power units into operation.

    Alternative sources operate with even more obvious dynamics. According to the calculations of the Interfax-Ukraine agency, nuclear power plants last year increased electricity generation by 13.1%, to 86.2 billion 205.4 kWh. In particular, production at the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant amounted to 35.5 billion kWh (+23.4%), South Ukrainian – 18.6 billion kWh (-3.8%), Rovno – 18.8 billion kWh (+10.3%), Khmelnitsky – 13.3 billion kWh (+20.5%). Thermal generation reduced output by 12.5%.

    It would not be an exaggeration to say that the stability of the entire Ukrainian energy sector depends on the condition and availability of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant turns out to be the largest link in nuclear generation.

    How many and to whom

    Nuclear power plants in Ukraine, like any other generation, were built in accordance with common Soviet Union industrial development plans.

    Thus, the construction of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant took place thanks to the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1977, taking into account the need to develop the industrial area of Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Krivoy Rog. The metallurgical and machine-building industries concentrated in this region required large amounts of electricity. To a large extent, local industry has retained its status as a key recipient of energy.

    By the end of 2021, according to the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, electricity consumption in the country increased to 154.8 billion kWh - taking into account technological losses. Without them, consumption amounted to 125.5 billion kWh.

    The main consumer was industry – 52.3 billion kWh, +6% to the level of 2020. The most active were the metallurgical industry (28.8 billion kWh, +6.4% to the level of 2020), fuel industry - 3.3 billion kWh (+0.9%), engineering – 3.5 billion kWh (+11.3%), chemical and petrochemical – 4.3 billion kWh (+4.6%), food and processing industry – 4.4 billion kWh (+1.5%), construction materials – 2.7 billion kWh (+14.4%), others – 5.2 billion kWh (+5%). Agricultural enterprises consumed 3.7 billion kWh (-2.8%), transport enterprises - 6.2 billion kWh (+8%), construction – 1.6 billion kWh (+11.2%).

    38.7 billion kWh (+5.8%) went to the needs of the population, municipal consumers - 15 billion kWh (+5.8%), other non–industrial consumers - 8.6 billion kWh (+16.5%).

    As a first approximation, we can say that the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant provided electricity to the entire population of Ukraine – or the entire metallurgy, fuel and machine-building industries combined.

    Fewer consumers

    How much Ukrainian industry needs have decreased can be said very approximately. According to the opinion of the head of the Ukrainian "Energoatom" Pyotr Kotin, which he voiced in an interview with Forbes in early May, over the past two and a half months, energy consumption in Ukraine has halved.

    This may well be true – according to Ukrainian data, as of May 20, 6.4 million people left the country, but about a million returned without finding a place abroad. Taking into account the fact that the real population of Ukraine as of February was no more than 35 million people, we can talk about a reduction in energy consumption by at least 15% due to the physical absence of consumers.

    It is difficult to say how much the energy consumption of the Ukrainian industry has decreased, given the sufficient randomness and politicisation of Ukrainian statistics. But even with such introductory data, the industrial production index of Ukraine has been steadily falling since 2010, with the exception of occasional periods of growth in 2010-2011, 2016 and 2020. In general, there is no reason not to believe the opinion of the head of Energoatom about the halving of electricity demand. Accordingly, we can expect an actual demand in the amount of 70-80 billion kWh.

    Excluding the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant, up to 50 billion kW of the nuclear power plant production remained in the hands of the Kiev regime, unless, of course, there are technical difficulties. As of 2021, only three power units of Ukrainian nuclear power plants have not progressed beyond their design operating dates – one unit respectively at each of the nuclear power plants - Zaporozhye, Rovno and Khmelnitsky.

    In order to exist in the previous mode of energy consumption, it is enough for Ukraine to keep the remaining Nuclear Power Plant units in current working condition and provide about 20-30 billion kWh generation of electricity from other sources. In other words, the loss of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant at this particular moment can be considered a tangible blow, but not a critical one for Ukraine.

    Of course, in this case we are not talking about energy support of any kind of development. The prospects of the Ukrainian industry are as pessimistic as possible, the largest energy consumers, who also generated a significant share of revenues to the Ukrainian budget through export supplies, had problems even before operation "Z".

    Thus, on January 6, Ukrainian security forces arrested the accounts of the largest metallurgical plant in Ukraine "Arcelor Mittal Krivoy Rog". This is a key enterprise of Krivoy Rog, the main employer of the region and one of the largest taxpayers in the country. On February 24, the day after the start of the special military operation, Arcelor Mittal Krivoy Rog announced the reduction of the work of the metallurgical plant to a technical minimum and the shutdown of work at the mines of the enterprise.

    The agricultural sector also shows an average estimate of the fall in production by half. The largest Ukrainian producer of sunflower oil, Kernel agroholding, reached only 10% of the previous export figures, Kernel Chairman Evgeny Osipov said in an interview with CNN on April 25. According to him, because of the war, the production of sunflower oil in Ukraine may fall by 40%. Another major exporter of sunflower oil, agroholding MKhP, in the first quarter reduced sales of sunflower oil MKhP by 41%.

    This is another argument in favour of the fact that the loss of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant will not be a disaster for the Ukrainian economy in the form in which it exists now. Rather, we can talk about the reduction of opportunities to trade electricity, on which the Ukrainian side hoped to earn.

    In an interview with Forbes, Pyotr Kotin reported that current technical capabilities allow Kiev to export up to 700 MW, and in the case of the construction of new lines, there was hope to export at least 2000 MW to Central and Eastern European countries – for example, to Lithuania.

    Ukrainian risks

    The role of nuclear power plants in the energy balance of Ukraine, as well as their effect, can significantly increase in winter. Based on world energy prices, as well as anti-Russian sanctions, due to which the cost of gas and oil will only increase, nuclear power plants will be a without-alternative condition for a relatively comfortable passage of the heating season 2022-2023 in Ukraine.

    What will be a safety net for Ukraine's nuclear power plants, in case of more than probable breakdowns on one or more reactors operating in full mode, is still unclear. A significant part of the thermal power plants were located in Donbass - the most powerful of them are the Uglegorsk Thermal Power Plant (3.6 million kW), Starobeshevsk Thermal Power Plant (~2 million kW), Lugansk and Kurakhovo Thermal Power Plant (~1.5 million kW each). For obvious reasons, the prospects for their use, taking into account the declared goal of "Operation Z" as the liberation of Donbass, are unclear.

    There are also thermal power plants on the territory controlled by Ukraine, including taking into account the extrapolation of hostilities to the map of the "new Ukraine".

    But here comes the question of fuel. Kiev can hardly count on coal supplies from Donbass or from Russia, which means that Poland, which has the largest coal reserves in Eastern Europe, gets the green light. It is of lower quality and more expensive than the coal of Donbass or Kuzbass. However, for economic and political reasons, Ukraine will not have to choose especially.

    It can be expected that in preparation for the heating season, agreements on the supply of Polish coal in sufficient volumes will take place. It is unclear who exactly will pay for them, but in the end all the costs will fall on the shoulders of the remaining Ukrainians.

    There is no doubt that a lot of coal will be needed. At the end of December 2021, the Ukrainian media, with reference to the local Ministry of Energy, reported that none of the thermal power plants has sufficient coal reserves in warehouses. Missile strikes on traction substations, bridges and other railway infrastructure will hinder the supply of the necessary volumes of coal by railways – they are unlikely to stop as long as the West continues to pump Ukraine with weapons.

    From the Russian side

    Based on the fact that the Kherson region will remain under Russian control, and later at least Zaporozhye will join it, and taking into account the industry-oriented structures of the future economies of the DPR and LPR, the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant will be a very useful acquisition. At a minimum, it is able to meet the household needs of adjacent regions.

    The example of Crimea, which lived for six months in conditions of a strict limit on electricity after the undermining of the power line in the Kherson region by Ukrainian-Tatar militants, is quite convincing.

    As soon as the Kiev leadership realises the fact of the final loss of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, all measures will be taken to maximise the aggravation of the socio-economic situation there. A future attempt to destabilise the energy system according to the Crimean scenario looks extremely likely.

    The most important thing in this regard is that the strategic importance of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant for the regions that have separated from Ukraine is too obvious. This, unfortunately, makes the Nuclear Power Plant a priority target for sabotage.

    A public declaration of intent on the use of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant in Russian interests is simply obliged to entail a sufficient level of protection of this facility from possible encroachments.

    An explosion at the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant will not only give Kiev the opportunity to worsen the life of the population in the liberated territories. Considerable efforts will be required to restore the energy supply of the region, and the very fact of an explosion at a nuclear power plant under Russian control will be used as much as possible for propaganda purposes.

    Despite the fact that the Russian Crimea, after the energy bridge from the Kuban and the construction of its own generation, is provided with electricity, it is not enough to power the Kherson region from the thermal power plant near Sevastopol or Simferopol. Accordingly, in the energy balance of the Kherson and the part of the Zaporozhye region controlled by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, their own production capacities are of great importance.

    Thus, in the current state of the Ukrainian economy and demography, the loss of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant will not be a serious blow – so far its loss is fully compensated by the remaining capacities. There are big risks regarding the heating season – the simultaneous reduction of nuclear generation and the lack of a clear understanding of the supply of thermal power plants with fuel coal.

    For Russia, the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant is of interest as a means of providing electricity to the liberated territories. At the same time, the probability of Ukrainian sabotage attacks against a nuclear power plant is seriously increasing.

    Average: 5 (3 votes)