Are things heading to war? NATO Rapid Reaction Forces will increase by 7.5 times

    The situation is alarming – but full of nuances
    access_time29 Jun 2022
    print 29 6 2022
     

    According to Western media, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced an increase in the alliance's rapid reaction force to more than 300,000 people from the current 40,000. Such a statement from the NATO Secretary General was made on the eve of the June 28-30 summit in Madrid, where, as expected, a new NATO security concept will be adopted, in which Russia will be recognised as a "global threat".

    The growth of a certain group of troops by 7.5 times is, of course, a serious reason for attention, especially if we are talking about Russia's direct military opponent. Some experts have drawn parallels with the size of the Russian Armed Forces group of 120,000-150,000 people, according to public information involved in the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, as a result of which pessimistic publications appeared about the imminent three-fold superiority of NATO over Russia in a particular region. That will not bring anything good to Russia – a three-fold superiority is considered a classic ratio for an attack.

    Obviously, there is nothing positive in this for Russia – even if we take into account the more than probable idea that Russia did not use everything it could in the Special Military Operation. However, the inevitability of a NATO attack does not stem from Stoltenberg's statements. Expanding the "rapid troops" to 300,000 will not be the easiest thing, and at this stage it looks more like a ritual statement.

    What is this?

    NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF) is a military unit that is allocated by the participating states to the operational command of the alliance and is designed to provide operational support to NATO operations.

    As a rule, their maintenance, powers and control become the subject of lengthy negotiations. Back in 2009, in the conditions of relatively peaceful coexistence of the West and Russia, the number of the then NRF of 20,000 fighters was more theoretical than practical, especially during the rotation of the American expeditionary corps in Europe. Official NATO resources at the time noted "a constant shortage of key NRF forces and assets, especially those that are necessary for conducting operations and the availability of which is of fundamental importance for the deployment and use of the NRF."

    Among the key shortcomings, weak coordination was noted, lack of guarantees of covering expenses in case of unforeseen – and it cannot be otherwise – NRF forces. In addition, it described "an excessively rigid differentiation of the alliance's forces into various categories, which prevents NATO from using all available forces and means more flexibly and complicates the use of NRF”, as well as a very conditional assessment of the real combat potential of specific units in a "patchwork" NATO design from representatives of different countries.

    There is a legend about the assessment of Romania by the German General Staff, who came to the conclusion that there is no difference in which camp Bucharest will join, since in any case 10 divisions will be needed - whether it is to break Romania - an enemy or to protect Romania - a friend. To a certain extent, the legend corresponds to reality. The American, German or French combat unit will be noticeably different from the Bulgarian one, although formally they all comply with NATO standards.

    Particularly rapid response

    In the 2000s, the NRF replaced the Mobile Forces of the NATO Command in Europe (AMF), created in 1960. Until the collapse of the USSR, the basis of "mobility" was the commitment of the United States to allocate a contingent whose strength was equal to ten divisions and which could be deployed and ready to defend West Germany within ten days (the concept of "10 in 10").

    In 2021, the concept changed to "four 30s". The current strength of the NRF of 40,000 people is distributed among 30 battalion tactical groups, 30 aviation squadrons and 30 ships. "Rapid response" assumes that these groups will be able to be in the conflict area within 30 (no later than 45) days.

    The deployment dates are determined based on the distribution of forces and means over a wide territory, and not even of one country, and the fact that they are part of the national armed forces of many states. How it looks like and how many representatives of different armies are in one battalion-tactical group can be found in the documents of NATO itself.

    An increase in the number of NRF almost by an order more will almost lead to a multiple complication of logistics and other procedures. As the practice of special operations in Ukraine has shown, gathering within a month in the conflict zone, the NRF may simply not be able to keep up with the rapidity of events. And this is if we ignore the fact that Russia is unlikely to allow ideal and safe conditions to arise for the implementation of the NATO deployment plan.

    NATO understands the slowness of its structure. Therefore, the Rapid Reaction Forces include the "fastest forces of the fastest" - the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) - about 20,000 people, of whom 5,000 can operate directly "on the ground". The term of application of the "fastest ones" is "within two to three days". In addition to VJTF, the NRF also has an Initial Follow-On Forces Group (IFFG) – all of the above are located on the territory of their countries.

    Assuming that the VJTF after the expansion of the NRF will be proportional to 150,000 people, in theory, one could really expect them to arrive at the theatre of military actions within the regular 2-3 days. But this is if you do not take into account that 7.5 times more planes, technicians, fuel, spare parts and etc. will be required for the transfer.

    The finances and people

    300,000 people in the new NRF should not be understood as the creation of an army of 300,000 people, but the transfer of 300,000 troops from the entire Euro-Atlantic to the NRF category. If Brussels and Washington decided to increase the NRF by physically increasing NATO troops, then several tasks would have to be solved.

    How much will it cost for the budgets of NATO countries and, separately, Europe to have a permanent "stay" of a contingent 7.5 times higher than usual one – taking into account weapons, maintenance, repairs, accommodation, food, medical insurance and other things – is an open question. In fact, Stoltenberg announced the creation of a group equal to or superior to the armed formations of Ukraine at the time of February 2022. This means that many NATO members will actually have to keep a significant part of their national armed forces in constant readiness.

    There is a high probability that, as now, the main burden would have to be borne by the United States. This, according to NBC, will be fraught with difficulties due to the drop in the number of people willing to serve. The situation is so difficult that some of the experts interviewed by the agency see it as a prologue of the conscription army.

    The top leadership of the Pentagon is currently trying to find new recruits to replenish the ranks of the fully volunteer forces. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin and Deputy Secretary of Defence Kathleen Hicks consider the shortage a serious problem – according to the Heritage Foundation, "it has not been so difficult for the military to sign recruits since 1973, when the United States left Vietnam”.

    The Heritage Foundation added that they do not believe that the revival of conscription is inevitable, but "2022 is the year when we question the sustainability of a fully voluntary army."

    The number of those eligible to enlist in the military continues to decline, the number of young men and women who are unsuitable due to obesity, drug use or criminal records is "more than ever”. Last month, Army Chief of Staff General James McConville testified before Congress that only 23% of Americans between the ages of 17 and 24 are eligible to serve, in comparison with 29% in recent years.

    An internal Pentagon survey conducted by NBC News showed that only 9% of young Americans eligible to serve in the military had any desire to enlist, which is the lowest figure since 2007. More than half of the young Americans who took part in the survey - about 57% - believe that they will have emotional or psychological problems after serving in the army. Almost half believe they would have physical problems.

    Among Americans surveyed by the Pentagon who were in the target age range for recruitment, only 13% of parents served in the army, compared with about 40% in 1995. The military considers parents to be one of the biggest factors influencing the service.

    Overall trust in US government institutions is also declining, and this has also affected the US armed forces. In 2021, the annual Reagan National Defence Survey conducted by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute showed that only 45% of Americans have great confidence in the military, which is 25 points less than in 2018.

    According to officials, this trend is likely to continue, as the number of the armed forces as a whole is declining, as the connection between society and the army. In 2021, an army study found that 75% of Americans between the ages of 16 and 28 knew almost nothing about the army.

    "This recruitment crisis is like a slow-moving wave coming at us," said one senior Defence Ministry official involved in recruitment and personnel matters. In 2022, the Pentagon fulfilled the recruitment plan by about 40%. The 2022 fiscal year ends in September, high hopes are pinned on school graduates, but the average enrolment forecast is 60% of the norm.

    We should not forget about the great internal tension in NATO over the increase in the number of armies and the "militarisation" of the economy. Many NATO member countries are ready to express verbal solidarity with the condemnation of Russia and call for collective security, but do not seek provocations. First of all, this is Hungary, but also these are Western European countries that simply do not have serious reason to be afraid of Russia.

    It's not Stoltenberg's statements that should be considered as the marker but the dynamics of changes in the NATO Readiness Plan, where the consensus framework of readiness, deployment speed, troop strength and other significant parameters are down on paper. Stoltenberg's idea is quite radical, which means that member countries like Turkey may require partners to pay a specific fee for support. We cannot rule out the intensification of anti-NATO sentiment in Europe, including in France, where the forces opposing NATO and for sovereignisation have seriously strengthened their positions in the parliamentary elections. 

    On the contrary, countries such as Poland will certainly support the idea of strengthening and expanding NATO's presence on their territory with all available forces.

    Conclusions.

    1. The statement of the NATO Secretary General about the growth of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force from 40,000 to 300,000 people should certainly be assessed as a serious and unfriendly step towards Russia and Belarus.

    2. An immediate threat of war doesn't follow from Stoltenberg's statement.

    3. The physical creation of a separate NRF group of 300,000 people is unlikely, it looks more realistic to expand the status of "permanently ready ones" to new parts of the armed forces of the alliance member countries.

    4. Based on the uneven number and quality of the armed forces of the member countries, we should expect the main burden to be placed on the US, Poland, Eastern European countries, possibly Germany and Britain.

    5. An increase in the number of NRF will entail a commensurate increase in the necessary funding.

    6. Jens Stoltenberg's idea looks like an initiative that can be implemented in accordance with its meaning only in the medium or long term. It is likely to be accompanied by very intensive and complex multilateral negotiations.

    7. The West's readiness for escalation, the results of which will not be felt in the near future, requires working out options for stopping the increased threat.

    Average: 5 (1 vote)