Hidden sensations in the US’ response to Russia's proposals

The written responses that the United States and NATO gave to Russian proposals to ensure equal and unified security on the Eurasian continent contain a large amount of valuable information. The media hysteria generated around the unconfirmed and logically unjustified "Russian invasion" of Ukraine has little to do with the essence of what is set out in the documents that the Russian side received.

Recall that Russia received a written response from the United States and NATO on January 26, they were handed over by American Ambassador John Sullivan, thereby confirming the correctness of the Russian thesis that it is necessary to negotiate with the United States, since NATO cannot have its own position that contradicts Washington's opinion.

The American side asked Moscow not to publish the answers received. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed readiness to meet the dialogue partners halfway, saying that, according to US representatives, the document was agreed with all Washington's allies, including Ukraine. "Therefore, I have no doubt that in the very near future it (the document – Ed.) will be leaked," Sergey Lavrov said at a press conference.

This prediction was brilliantly confirmed on February 2, when the Spanish newspaper El Pais published photocopies of confidential documents. Later, their authenticity was recognised by sources in Washington, which makes it possible to study the text part of the reaction of the United States and NATO to the Russian proposals.

"Violated and abandoned"

The letter received from the North Atlantic Alliance attracted major media attention. In particular, because it is written simply, and even primitive. Approximately 70% of its volume is taken up by stock phrases and cliches, and the entire document as a whole does not give the impression of a deeply and thoughtfully elaborated position, demonstrating low value in terms of further dialogue.

The response begins with the words "NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia. We have always striven for peace, stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and a Europe whole, free and at peace. These remain our goals and our abiding vision."

It ends with the statement that NATO does not seek confrontation, but "cannot and will not compromise on the principles upon which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest," emphasising the importance of the principle of a "collective response" to an attack on one of the alliance's member countries.

Among other things, Russia is accused of not wanting to feel happy about the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in conditions extremely unfavourable for Russia.

"No other partner has been offered a comparable relationships or a similar institutional framework. Yet Russia has broken the trust at the core of our cooperation and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture," the authors of the letter sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry complain.

These responses are laced with suggestions and demands. In particular, Russia is required (paragraph 8.3 of the document) to "withdraw forces from Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova where they are deployed without host-nation consent”. Obviously, it is impossible to fulfil this thesis, which demonstrates, among other things, the legal incompetence of the drafters of the document.

So, the OSCE monitoring mission operating in the conflict zone in Donbass, for almost 8 years, could not detect signs of the presence of regular units of the Russian army. In addition, the "withdrawal" of Russian troops will be most opposed in the regions that NATO considers the territories of Georgia or Moldova.

The issue of the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Transnistria should be considered separately. For example, former Moldovan President Igor Dodon has repeatedly insisted on the permanent presence of peacekeepers in the region. This means that the consent of the host party still took place, at least in this case.

Individual points in the answer demonstrate discouraging ambition. So, in paragraph 8.5, it is proposed to impose on Russia the refusal "from coercive force postering, aggressive nuclear rhetoric, and malign activities directed against Allies (NATO member countries - Ed.) and other countries”.

This phrase inevitably leads to two surprising conclusions. Firstly, NATO officially claims to be a censor of Russia's actions around the globe - the geography of "other countries" and what actions are considered "malign" are not specified, as is the essence of the mysterious "nuclear rhetoric". Secondly, for its part, NATO does not assume anything equivalent in terms of correcting its own actions.

Also, Russia is required to resume the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) "with annual reports", abandon the strengthening of the anti-satellite defence circuit, and “de-escalate" the situation around Ukraine by "verifiable means".

It is unnecessary to specify that Russia, in the opinion of Brussels, should carry out these actions unilaterally. It remains to agree with Sergey Lavrov, who admitted that he "was a little ashamed for those who wrote these texts”.

Among the relatively positive points in the NATO response that deserve attention are the ideas of expanding the practice of warning exercises, introducing measures to avoid incidents at sea and in the air, as well as creating a "hotline" for maintaining emergency communications.

The letter focuses on the need to "negotiate with the United States on future arms control and disarmament agreements and arrangements that encompass all US and Russian nuclear weapons," as well as cooperation on ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their launchers. This is the only time a NATO letter mentions a specific member state, and it seems that this particular paragraph was written by European military bureaucrats literally at the dictation of the United States.

Open, but very narrow, doors

There is a point in the NATO response that requires some clarification. Paragraph 8.2 provides the alliance's view that, in response to Russia's proposal to leave Ukraine a neutral state for life, it confirms "the commitment to NATO's Open-door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty."

First of all, “NATO's Open Door Policy", from a legal point of view, does not exist in nature. This is nothing more than a beautiful name for the media, explaining the essence of Article 10 of the mentioned agreement, and not a concept presented by any system-forming document.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty is formulated as "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty”. That is, to enter the "open doors", you need to enlist universal consent and receive an appropriate invitation. And also have the necessary capacity to contribute to security.

There is no consensus on Ukraine's membership in NATO, and a number of "old" (France, Germany) and "new" (Hungary) members of the alliance oppose it. The question of Ukraine's perception from the point of view of its contribution to security remains open - for the foreseeable future, the Ukrainian territory clearly acts as a factor of instability. The admission of Ukraine to NATO is very likely to cause the Kiev leadership a certain "dizziness", which can be expressed in an attack on Crimea or Donbass, where Russian citizens may suffer.

The inevitable Russian reaction to such a move will be a serious test of NATO's internal stability. Even now, some leaders of the alliance's member countries declare their unwillingness to sacrifice their compatriots for the sake of Ukraine, as the Croatian President Zoran Milanovic publicly and clearly stated. Moreover, the notorious Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which the alliance refers to in its response, can allow for a variety of interpretations.

According to it, in the event of an armed attack on a member of the alliance, other countries agree to assist it "by any action that they deem necessary, including the use of armed force”. Exactly what actions may be considered "necessary" is not specified, which means that member states have the space to formally fulfil their allied duty, avoiding substantive intervention in the conflict.

In terms of how much the position of NATO on Russia may change, the next summit of the organisation, scheduled for June 2022, and the declarations adopted as a result of it, will be symptomatic. And, more precisely, whether the prospects of Ukraine and Georgia's membership in NATO, which have been moving from document to document for many years, will be confirmed.

If the NATO response looks like, at best, an interim document, then a letter on behalf of the United States is much more interesting.

Hidden sensations

The response received from the United States is much better, more succinct and informative than the letter from NATO. If one carefully studies the positions presented by the American side, one can find a number of extremely interesting theses, the main one of which is in the first part of the document.

"The United States continues to strongly support NATO's Open-door Policy and believes that the NATO-Russia Council is the appropriate forum to discuss this issue. The United States is entering this process in good faith and with the aim of improving Euro-Atlantic security," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a response.

In fact, the United States stated that the implementation of the "open door policy" implies a discussion with Russia, and in this discussion the United States is ready to speak on behalf of the entire NATO. Such a statement negates all publicly expressed theses that only NATO itself and countries wishing to join it can influence the "personnel policy". It turns out that there is also the opinion of Russia.

The United States also expressed its readiness “for a discussion of the indivisibility of security”, specifying that the draft proposed by Russia is "one concept in the rich context of the many commitments OSCE participating states have made to each other and cannot be viewed in isolation”. Once again, there is a willingness to discuss and agree on comprehensive security in one way or another.

The United States stands ready to discuss “conditions-based reciprocal" transparency measures and reciprocal commitments by both the United States and Russia to refrain from deploying offensive ground-launched missile systems and permanent combat-ready forces in Ukrainian territory.

In this part of the letter, there is a remarkable phrase: "The United States is concerned about Russia's units and equipment in Ukraine, including its further build-up of military forces in Crimea and on Ukraine’s borders." Using this wording, the authors of the US response put Crimea in a curious category: on the one hand, Crimea is not classified as a region "on Ukraine’s borders", and on the other hand, it is positioned as "not quite Ukraine", otherwise there would be no reason to distinguish the peninsula separately.

Also, the United States, “in consultation with our NATO Allies and partners”, and on the basis of equivalent commitments by Russia, “is also prepared to explore, in the appropriate context, an enhanced exercise notification regime and nuclear risk reduction measures, including strategic nuclear bomber platforms”. Thus, they expressed their readiness to follow the path of reducing tensions that arise due to the presence of US bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons near Russian borders.

The United States is ready for additional measures to prevent incidents at sea and in the air. We are talking about both the "revival" of existing mechanisms that are ineffective for one reason or another, and the creation of new ones.

In addition, the United States is ready to discuss the restoration of control over land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and the creation of a "transparency mechanism" to confirm the absence of cruise missiles at coastal facilities in Romania and Poland.

The United States says it is ready to "immediately" begin discussing arms control agreements, including all US and Russian nuclear weapons, including tactical ones.

Even at this stage, we can say that Russia's tough stance has borne some fruit. A significant part of what the United States is ready to do in 2022 has been categorically rejected by Washington in past years - the INF Treaty, the cancellation of flights of potentially dangerous aircraft near Russian borders, and stopping the deployment of missile systems capable of performing a strike function in addition to missile defence.

Bargain or an occasion?

The US response contains a list of its own demands, linked to the proposals described above. It is worth noting that in some cases the demands look like clear and logical concerns for the United States, in others - as a formal condition, the fulfilment of which will allow Russia to meet halfway without losing face.

The main condition put forward by the United States, which completes the entire document, reads as follows: “progress can only be achieved on these issues (described above - Ed.) in an environment of de-escalation with respect to Russia's threatening actions towards Ukraine." Since there is no escalation of Russia's aggressive actions towards Ukraine, it is not objectively difficult to fulfil this condition.

Among the substantive concerns expressed by the United States, it is worth noting concerns "about Russia’s large military exercises” and the continued introduction of new 9M729 missiles for “Iskander” missile systems, the characteristics of which the United States considers to violate the provisions of the INF Treaty.

The United States and NATO are "very concerned" about Russia's nuclear capabilities and "the development of novel intercontinental-range nuclear weapons delivery systems not currently accounted for under the New START Treaty”. It is not difficult to guess that we are talking about the “Burevestnik” missile with unlimited range, the “Avangard” hypersonic unit and the “Poseidon” nuclear super-torpedo.

The United States offers to discuss these concerns in further negotiations, including its own proposals and Russia's initial demands.

A number of preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the responses of the US and NATO.

1. The desire to negotiate not with Brussels, but exclusively with Washington, was justified - without the United States, NATO does not demonstrate the ability to conduct constructive dialogue, even on strategically important issues.

2. Russia's concern and willingness to back it up with the necessary means was expressed effectively and understood by Washington, which should be a reason for further negotiations.

3. Washington will have to take Russia's position on Ukraine's admission to NATO into account - and it is ready to do so on behalf of the entire NATO.

4. There is still no willingness to act in support of Ukraine on behalf of NATO or the United States in the event of a far-fetched or real threat to this territory.

5. Nuclear weapons and military-technical progress are still the key to Russia's subjectivity in dialogue with the United States and NATO.