How the Ukrainian crisis raised Macron's approval rating

Back at the beginning of this year, Emmanuel Macron's chances of being re-elected for a second term caused skepticism among experts. The economic reforms initiated by him did not lead to an increase in the welfare of the French, and foreign policy activity turned into a series of severe and painful failures, among which at the first place were the creation of the AUKUS bloc and the rupture of multibillion–dollar military contracts with Australia.

If to look at things from an objective point of view, Macron's presidency is just as "successful" as the rule of his predecessor Francois Hollande, who did not even put forward his candidacy for a second term amid a catastrophic drop in the rating.

However, unlike Hollande, whose reputation has always been under attack due to image losses and scandals, Macron is an unsurpassed "genius" of his own PR. And today, the results of opinion polls, according to which Macron leads the presidential race by a huge margin, speak for themselves.

The Ukrainian crisis has given Macron a chance to fully realise his potential as a political showman. It is well known that Paris at least indulged Kiev's actions aimed at destroying the Minsk Agreements, and therefore now it bears its part of responsibility for everything that happens in Ukraine.

However, Macron's trips to Moscow and Kiev and his desire to "moderate" the Ukrainian crisis, gave the French audience the impression of major diplomatic efforts undertaken to prevent a dramatic denouement.

Against the background of the total sanctions war against Russia, Macron also showed caution and did not put pressure on French business with demanding immediate withdrawal from Russia.

French voters also could not help but notice that at least Macron's rhetoric towards Russia is sufficiently balanced and adequate. For example, during his public addresses, he emphasises that France is not at war with Russia, recalls Paris' ties with the "great European Russian people”.

The flow of news from Ukraine plunged France into an atmosphere of anxiety and frustration, created the effect of "consolidation around the flag", which objectively works for Macron. In this situation, he manages to get the maximum propaganda effect from various kinds of public political gestures, including rather ambiguous ones. For example, the call for Europe to prepare for a "possible war" looks frankly provocative in the context of the growing confrontation between Russia and the West. All this speaks of Macron's attempts to position himself in the Ukrainian conflict as an "honest broker".

If last year Macron spoke about the "European army", which should be able to protect the EU from "Russia, China and even the United States”, then in the current conditions, the goals of the possible remilitarisation of Europe are quite transparent. It is implied that the opponent is the Russian Federation.

Switching attention to the Ukrainian agenda makes it possible for Macron to divert the attention of the French from their own economic problems, as well as from the situation in Corsica, which has escalated in recent weeks, where the population is increasingly determined towards Paris.

Being a convinced Atlanticist, Macron confidently plays on the patriotic feelings of the French, who have not forgotten that until relatively recently France really had strategic autonomy and successfully blocked all the US’ attempts to impose a vassal status on it. Today, the practical meaning of Macron's militaristic rhetoric boils down to initiatives that are unlikely to help the EU become a military-strategic player like Russia, China or the United States.

It is not unreasonable to assume that the real geopolitical competitor of France, which is in the same weight category with it, is modern Turkey.

In recent years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully squeezed the French out of their traditional spheres of influence with complete helplessness on the part of Paris. Therefore, in the context of Macron's European defensive initiatives, we can only talk about an attempt to create an alternative to Turkey on the Mediterranean flank, which France is clearly not coping with at the moment.

I must say that Macron has some limited opportunities to involve Italy, and especially Greece, in this project. Probably, the creation of anti-Turkish defence alliances in Southern Europe is the maximum that the broadcasted statements of the French president can result in.

There is no reason to doubt that Macron will win the upcoming French presidential election in April and will continue his generally pro-Atlantic course, diluted with conciliatory and neutral rhetoric towards Russia.

At the same time, the sympathies of French society, the interests of business and the ambitions of the military do not fit into this course. And the request for France to develop, not in words, but in deeds, according to the precepts of Charles de Gaulle, remains on the agenda. 

Elena Panina, Director of the RUSSTRAT Institute