China: Will Xi Jinping's third leap to power take place?

It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the world press, along with numerous publications devoted to the events in Ukraine, a prominent place is given to the description of the situation in the China-Russia-USA triangle. It did not arise in connection with the Ukrainian crisis, it only gave it new shades and revealed some important nuances in the politics of these countries. 

Let's recall how US President Donald Tump tried to turn Russia to his side in the confrontation with China and act as an "anti-Kissinger". Henry Kissinger managed to break the Soviet-Chinese alliance at the time by establishing special relations between the United States and China. A long-term trend of close relations between the two countries has been formed. Trump proposed, if not to return the format of the "Big Eight", then at least invite Russia, along with South Korea and India, to the G7 summit.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo then argued that "this opens up space for Russia for geopolitical manoeuvre" due to some "natural circumstances" not encrypted by the Americans. But Moscow, in the face of an acute US-Chinese confrontation, did not succumb to this trick and set a course for a new level of economic cooperation with Beijing.

Now the situation in connection with the Ukrainian crisis has changed to exactly the opposite. As a recent telephone conversation between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping showed, the Americans threatened the Chinese with receiving retaliatory measures from the West in case they help Russia. Beijing did not accept the ultimatum. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said that "... these are undisguised hegemonic threats, indicating that the US government is guided by Cold War thinking”.

At the same time, the proposed intriguing reference to the theoretical understanding, as Beijing claims, of "wrong methods", has become a real know-how of Chinese diplomacy, which the US State Department was not ready for. It is curious that, on the one hand, China recognises Moscow's just concern about NATO's advance to the East, and on the other hand, it does not refuse political discussion. 

According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, "Beijing's position on the Ukrainian crisis is objective and fair, and time will show that it is on the right side of history”. And again, there is a recommendation according to which "in order to solve the crisis and ensure stability on the European continent, it is necessary to abandon the mentality of the cold war and bloc confrontation”.

But in the current situation, it is difficult to imagine those who want to take part in the proposed discussion. If we talk about specifics, Beijing offers to promote diplomatic methods of resolving the Ukrainian crisis and declares its readiness to act as a mediator. Its set of theses: China is for peace, supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. 

Some experts believe that such a position is “ambiguous", although it is "in favour of Russia”. The reasons are named: China's huge trade, economic and technological ties with the West, its unwillingness to include the Ukrainian crisis in the complex of problems with the United States. At the same time, Washington does not conduct, at least – for now, bargaining with China and does not offer it "gingerbread" in case of embedding in the American fairway. This is the first striking feature.

The essence of the second one is in the following. Chinese state and party publications hold an official point of view regarding the Ukrainian crisis. But there is also a so-called "free press" in the country, on the pages of which the Chinese expert community "walks". Such publications contain statements that "China and the Asia-Pacific region benefit from staying away from the turmoil in Europe”, and "it is in China's interests to distance itself from Russia."

Thus, in the Global Times newspaper, Zheng Yongnian, a professor at universities in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, writes that "as a result of the events in Ukraine, the modernisation of the Chinese economy will not only avoid suffering, but, on the contrary, China will gain a more influential role in international affairs," and that in the future "Russia's dependence on China will increase”. 

Pluralism in judgments, of course, creates a political peculiarity in the assessments of the position taken by Beijing. On the one hand, it seems to be a manifestation of the political flexibility of the Chinese leadership, on the other, the presented palette of different points of view indicates the ongoing struggle in the depths of the Chinese party and state leadership. 

Now a lot has come to rest on the confrontation unfolding on the Ukrainian platform between Russia and the West. Beijing is watching this fight very closely. In addition, China is preparing for the country's most important 20th CCP Congress, which will focus on Xi's "third term".

He has been the Chinese leader since 2013 and is trying to maintain the image of a fatherly benevolent politician striving for the peaceful strengthening of China. At this stage, there is no need for him to make sharp movements in foreign policy, and the chairman intends to continue the course of building Chinese greatness. 

If we take this position as the main point of reference when assessing China's foreign policy, then a lot of things line up in an explicable logical series.

Elena Panina, Director of the RUSSTRAT Institute