Ukraine negotiations in Paris will test the strategic autonomy of the EU

Will Europe be able to speak with its own voice on the most acute topic for it – the security crisis artificially inflated around Ukraine? This is the main question that was supposed to be given an answer in Paris on January 26. The stakes are high. And when President Emmanuel Macron on Monday announced a meeting of the Normandy Four (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) at the level of the leaders' political advisers, he certainly understood this.

Negotiations in this format for the end of January 2022 were scheduled back in August last year. But it was almost impossible to predict whether they would take place. The Normandy Format itself was in a coma for about six months. And the sharp discussions on security guarantees, which have been keeping the world in suspense for the second month, and the escalation of the crisis around Ukraine have called into question all existing formats in general.

In this situation, there was only one thing left – to take the initiative into one’s own hands. Macron did this on behalf of his country, the EU presidency. Commenting on the initiative, the representative of the Elysee Palace stressed its meaning: the French president believes that there is "space for diplomacy and de-escalation around the Ukrainian crisis." To use this chance, Macron intends to hold telephone talks with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine on Friday. And his special representative Pierre Vimont has been sent to Moscow.

There are clearly forces in the EU that want negotiations, not escalation. Hence the question – what are these forces? And is there any point in developing dialogue with them?

The meeting of the EU foreign ministers at the beginning of the week confirmed: The EU member states are trying to present a united front on key security issues, but as soon as it comes to specifics – the interests of countries and methods of action – unity has not happened.

As soon as Macron, opening the French presidency, declared that the path to European "strategic autonomy" lies through an inter-European dialogue on security, which at the same time is the basis for dialogue with Russia, he was accused of eroding the "consensus of the West".

In turn, the intentions of the Baltic states to supply missiles to Ukraine with Washington's consent cause discontent in Europe among opponents of escalation: they see this as an intention to disrupt the dialogue. London, which seems to have no relation to the EU after Brexit, is also diligently adding fuel to the fire, but is successfully mastering the role of a mentor. Thus, Prime Minister Johnson did not deny himself the pleasure of noting: "A very bad time has been chosen for discussions about strategic autonomy in Europe." In Paris, it was well understood to whom it was addressed.

All these inconsistencies and disagreements are no longer just nuances. Rather, these are signs of an emerging split, not only on the question of how to build relations with Moscow further, but also on the prospects for Euro-building. Now Berlin has vetoed the supply of weapons to Ukraine, the components of which are manufactured in Germany. But tomorrow, supporters of escalation in retaliation may try to ban Nord Stream 2.

Until recently, Moscow saw, not unreasonably, in such a discord, evidence that there is no one in the EU to talk to about security, because there is no unified position and there will not be. However, exactly the same problem is faced by those who are trying to drive the European Union into a confrontation with Moscow. The EU doesn’t drive into it either – and for the same reason: it doesn't speak with one voice.

There is enough confirmation, here are some examples. Contrary to the American and British example, the EU foreign ministers considered the demonstrative recall of diplomats from Ukraine unjustified. Berlin, Paris and Rome do not want to see Ukraine in NATO and increase arms supplies to this country. The EU foreign ministers evaded the formulation of a unified position on new sanctions against Russia (the issue was transferred to the European Commission). And, of course, an important sign is the meeting in the Normandy Format in Paris. The first real attempt has been made to bring down the degree of confrontation and test the chances of a non-military way out of the escalation around Ukraine in the European format.

Thus, Washington will not be able to formulate the position of the "EU allies" as an anti-Russian consensus in the announced written response to Russian security proposals.

When a glass of Calvados, Normandy apple vodka, is served in the middle of a hearty lunch and a heated discussion, the French immediately understand what is being discussed: it's time to "punch a Normandy hole”. Then, you see, the conversation will go better, and there will be enough strength to get to dessert. Macron is trying to do something similar in the midst of discussions and gestures, which everyone has had enough of and which only raise the stakes in the confrontation.

Perspective? It should be considered in the context of the shock of many European and especially French politicians from the creation of the Anglo-Saxon partnership AUKUS (USA, UK, Australia), which shifted the priorities of geopolitics to the Indo-Pacific region. In light of this, in many "old–timers" of the European Union, there is a strong fear that in the foreseeable future NATO will be repurposed for other tasks and even a different geography, which will be better combined with the new priorities of Washington and London, but will take less and less into account European ones, including in the field of security.

In this context, Paris proposes to take a step towards "European autonomy": the "EU Strategic Compass" should be presented in March. This concept will define a common vision of external threats to the security of the European Union and methods of responding to them, including the development of weapons and planning independent operations without the United States and NATO. The escalation of tension around Ukraine creates prerequisites for it not to come to any "compasses".

Accordingly, Paris is the initiator of this concept of European "strategic autonomy - and those European allies who supported it are not interested in "foreign" wars on the continent. As is Russia, concerned about NATO's advance to its borders. This creates the ground for dialogue. And it can suggest fundamentally new ways out of the discussion about global security, which is being brought to a standstill by the constant escalation around Ukraine. The tougher the confrontation around fictional threats, the more obvious the need for measures to counteract real threats will be. These include the creation of joint transparency mechanisms by Russia and the EU in order to monitor military manoeuvres and have control over conventional weapons, as well as medium- and shorter-range missiles.

Another thing is that the question of with whom and in what formats to talk about these topics in the EU remains open.

Elena Panina - Director of the RUSSTRAT Institute