Will Nagorno-Karabakh become a "Caucasian Kosovo"?
When the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh became more complicated, Moscow, as always, had to act as a "fire brigade". Russian President Vladimir Putin contacted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan by phone. The same contact between the countries were carried out through the defence and foreign ministries. At the same time, there was one standard formula in the final statements, according to which the parties confirmed "the importance of the consistent implementation of all the provisions of the trilateral statements of November 9, 2020, January 11 and November 26, 2021”.
Moscow is concerned about many things. The escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh occurred at the time of the development of the Ukrainian crisis, statements by Western and Ukrainian politicians about the need to open a "second front" against Russia in Transcaucasia after Ukraine. But on the eve, Baku and Yerevan sent positive signals to each other about their readiness not only to implement a plan to unblock transport corridors and establish cargo and passenger flows through them, but also to prepare a peace treaty. With its difficulties, this process was moving forward. And suddenly there was a breakdown.
For the first time since the signing of the peace agreement on November 9, 2020, Azerbaijan sent troops to the village of Parukh (in Azerbaijani - Farux) in the area of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping contingent on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. No one knows what operational necessity dictated such a decision by Baku. And as a result, a crisis situation was created, fraught with a transition to an armed conflict. Moreover, Russian peacekeepers turned out to be a kind of hostages, whose actions Yerevan and Baku began to criticise.
It should also be recalled that Pashinyan said at a government meeting that he intends to revive the work of the OSCE Minsk Group on the Karabakh settlement, and that Baku's five-point proposals on concluding a peace agreement were transmitted to it.
And immediately important nuances began to come out. The fact is that the EU and the Minsk Group did not directly participate in the preparation of the peace agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh on November 9, 2020. This is "A". The essence of "B" is that Yerevan's appeal to the OSCE Minsk Group comes at a time when Poland is acting as the OSCE Chairperson-in-office, and Warsaw's attitude to the Ukrainian crisis is well known.
Now about "C". In the context of the aggravation of relations between Russia and the West, when, according to Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, "there is a serious crisis of European security”, there is no certainty that the OSCE Minsk Group co–chair countries – Russia, France and the United States – will take any agreed decision. It is no coincidence that the role of the main "disengagement" is assumed by the head of the European Council, Charles Michel. It is on his initiative and mediation that Aliyev and Pashinyan are to meet in Brussels on April 6. At the same time, the main topic of the negotiations is outlined as follows: preparation of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
A draft of this document has also been published. It includes five points: mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity, absence of territorial claims to each other, rejection of security threats in interstate relations, delimitation and demarcation of the state border, establishment of diplomatic relations. And finally, "the opening and construction of transport communications and the establishment of cooperation in other areas of mutual interest”.
Thus, it is obvious that Yerevan takes the issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh out of the equation of its relations with Baku, although at the public level Armenia declares that the "Karabakh problem" exists, and the issue of the rights of Karabakh Armenians should allegedly be fixed in the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani comprehensive settlement. Azerbaijan's position is that there is no problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, it has already been solved, and only on such conditions is Baku ready to negotiate and sign the document.
As for the EU, it states that "the parties need to get involved in negotiations for a comprehensive solution to all existing problems," although Armenia and Azerbaijan have long been involved in it with Russia's mediation efforts.
But for some reason, Brussels is optimistic. It hopes that it will be able to replace the agreement on November 9, 2020 with a new agreement and radically change the situation. According to Baku expert Ilgar Velizade, we are talking about "Moscow's new role in the negotiation process due to the almost complete rupture of relations with European institutions”. Certain forces are rushing to take advantage of this situation both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and beyond their borders. Which ones?
A little earlier, the BUDROOO NEWS channel reported that the diplomats of France and Armenia are holding intensive meetings in Yerevan, Paris and New York. The purpose of these meetings is to try to delegitimise the agreement of November 9, 2020, which stopped the war in the region. At the same time, French President Emmanuel Macron and Pashinyan are considering the possibility of adopting a new plan that provides an opportunity for Baku and Yerevan to "sort each other out independently," and states interested in a particular conflict resolution are invited to "act at their discretion, without Russia”.
As for Azerbaijan, it is not so much Turkey as British intelligence that looms behind its back. By the way, when the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh was still going on, the British company Anglo Asian Mining (the operator for the development of gold deposits in Azerbaijan) announced plans to start work on the search and extraction of gold in the Karabakh territories, which came under the control of Baku. One of the leaders of Anglo Asia Mining is former White House Chief of Staff John Sununu.
Now the chairman of the Armenian Parliament's committee on regional and Eurasian integration Armen Gorgyan says that Baku wants to achieve the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh, that is, "to put an end to the political solution of the Karabakh problem”. However, rumours are circulating on the sidelines of Brussels and Yerevan, as if Michel could propose a scenario of "diluting" Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh by representatives of other countries, the "most neutral" in political terms, in order to reduce Moscow's ability to act as the only "fire brigade" in the region.
It is believed that only with such a course of events can the EU declare itself as, if not the leading one, then - after Russia and Turkey - a significant player in solving regional security issues. However, will this suit Baku? After all, with such a course of events, Nagorno-Karabakh can become a "Caucasian Kosovo".
As for Russia, it is not difficult for it to block attempts to penetrate into Transcaucasia by countries such as France and the United Kingdom. Under any prospects and conditions, one should not forget that Transcaucasia has always been and will always remain an integral zone of Russian geopolitical interests, so Moscow cannot and should not leave here under any circumstances. But at any cost, it should not hold on to inadequate political allies there either.