A blow to the bridge in Dnepr as a point of the future partition of Ukraine

    The hit of "Kalibr" on a bridge on the territory of the relatively calm Dnepr may indicate the contours of the "New Ukraine"
    access_time06 May 2022
    print 6 5 2022
     

    On the evening of May 4, eyewitnesses reported a missile strike on the Amur Bridge on the territory of the Ukrainian Dnepr – the city through which the river of the same name flows. Dnepropetrovsk, as the settlement was called before the so-called decommunisation, is one of the most important financial, logistics and industrial centres of Ukraine. So far, damage to the urban infrastructure has been limited to the local airport and military facilities scattered abundantly around the settlement.

    Recently, strikes on the railway infrastructure of Ukraine have become a familiar phenomenon, correct from the point of view of military strategy. In the conditions of the practically unlimited resource base of the UAF, which is represented by the entire NATO bloc, blocking the supply routes of weapons, fuel and ammunition to the front line becomes a priority.

    Strikes on strategic bridges have already taken place – first of all, this is a bridge in Zatoka in the Odessa region of Ukraine. But the missile hitting the Amur Bridge makes it possible to draw several conclusions.

    Firstly, this is far from the last blow to the bridges in Dnepropetrovsk. The oldest in the city Amur or Stary Bridge has been the main railway line across the Dnieper in the Ekaterinoslav province since the 19th century. The modern bridge is large and strong enough to be disabled with a single hit. The fate of the bridge in Zatoka shows that we should expect at least another 3-4 hits before the bridge is reliably destroyed.

    Destroying the Amur Bridge does not make sense if there is no strike on the second railway bridge. The Merefo-Kherson railway bridge runs from the Dnieper to the south, and is considered as one of the longest arch bridges in Europe. The features of its design also suggest repeated direct hits for guaranteed destruction. In addition, there are at least five automobile bridges in the city.

    Secondly, the same work will have to be done with the bridges of Zaporozhye, located downstream of the Dnieper – otherwise the destruction of the bridges to the north alone will have a limited effect. Here the Dnieper can be crossed by the “Preobrazhensky bridges" or by the new bridge completed in 2019.

    Thus, it is most likely possible to say that the complex destruction of bridges across the Dnieper, along which reinforcements can arrive to the Ukrainian group entrenched in the area of Severodonetsk-Gulyai-Pole, has begun.

    Thirdly, since the bridges across the Dnieper in Kiev have not yet been destroyed and there are no signs of such plans, most likely, the priority at this stage of Operation Z is the creation of a water boundary south of Dnepropetrovsk.

    It would be most logical to imagine that thereby the command of the Z units wants to get greater security of the left flank with a potential offensive north of Mariupol. Contrary to popular belief, the Ukrainian leadership has to keep a fairly large grouping in Kiev, given the "overhanging" Belarus from the north, from where V units may appear again at any moment, proving the ability to reach the suburbs of the Ukrainian capital in a few days.

    Of course, there may be other explanations that have practical meaning to one degree or another. Another obvious bonus of the emergence of a fully-fledged water boundary will be insurance in case the events in the east of Ukraine turn out to be unpleasant for Operation Z.

    The last, but by no means significant conclusion from the strike on the bridge in Dnepropetrovsk may be the perception of the Dnieper line as the border of the "new Ukraine" - a tactical one or for the coming decades.

    The restoration of each of the destroyed major railway bridges will require considerable time for both the UAF and the Z units, as well as for any of the civil administrations, regardless of their state and political affiliation. The opposing side will try to disrupt the restoration of such bridges by all means, which means that their construction becomes a relatively peacetime task.

    Accordingly, in the near future, fully–fledged cargo transportation between the western and eastern parts of Ukraine will be blocked - and in general, any cargo, and not only military or dual-use ones. If automobile bridges are preserved, then some kind of infrastructure connection will be preserved, but it will be difficult to talk about serious economic ties – many types of cargo, like coal, cannot be delivered by road transport at all.

    A geographical line of division of the territory of modern Ukraine appears in a natural way, where there will be several western and eastern "Berlins" at once, between the parts of which there will be not a wall, but the Dnieper in its lower course.

    It has been said many times that the number of the Z grouping is clearly insufficient to take control of the entire territory of Ukraine in terms of months. The option of destroying the UAF groups in the east of Ukraine, provided if the supply of weapons, ammunition and replenishment of personnel is stopped, looks more realistic.

    At the same time, it would be overly optimistic to assume that this is the end of the special military operation. Western Ukraine, which is now heavily pumped up with weapons, has not gone anywhere – the destruction of bridges and substations prevents the transfer of large volumes to the East, but does not prevent the spread of MANPADS and ATGMs, coupled with other more powerful systems and armoured vehicles, in Galicia and other, maximally nationalist-minded regions of Ukraine.

    First of all, it matters when planning the liberation of Nikolaev and Odessa. Well, if the tasks of Operation Z involve the liberation of the whole of Ukraine, then this will clearly require more resources than the contingent currently involved.

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