World-historical significance of the battle for Ukraine

1. Assessment of the situation

Russia's military operation to coerce Ukraine towards denazification and civil peace is the first major battle between Russia and the united West, whose proxy force is the puppet regime of US-occupied Ukraine.

At the time of writing (early March 2022), military operations are in the phase of passing the first third of the way. Russia has almost destroyed and continues to systematically destroy the command and information, warehouse and transport infrastructure of the Nazi regime of Ukraine.

Key cities such as Mariupol, Odessa, Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, and Kiev are completely or partially surrounded. The encirclement ring is being tightened, and it is clear that the campaign will end with a complete blockade of these cities with the aim of avoiding their assault in order to prevent huge civilian casualties, which the UAF and the nationalist corps do not allow to leave the cities, turning them into human shields.

The rate of development of the offensive has decreased relative to the first days of the operation, however, it is clear that Russia's strategic plan for the military campaign is being implemented in accordance with the goals and deadlines set, and the clarifications are operational and tactical in nature and do not affect the planned timing of the outcome of the operation as a whole. General considerations have already been expressed regarding the inexpediency of delaying the military operation.

However, it is equally, if not more important, not to set a strict deadline for the military campaign due to the significance of the uncertainty factor. This is the first time that the Russian army has solved a problem of this complexity, so no exact dates have been announced in advance. This does not mean that they do not exist in principle, and they are not guided in the course of military planning.

Russia's blitzkrieg in Ukraine was not planned initially due to the scale of the territory and the presence of a large concentration of formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The effect of the initial surprise was objectively short-lived and turned into a fight to deplete resources. Despite all the disadvantages, this phase in the campaign in Ukraine was inevitable and should not be considered a flop or failure. It is clear that the Russian Armed Forces will avoid losses both among personnel and among the civilian population.

This means that instead of direct battles, the General Staff of the Russian Defence Ministry will seek to block supply routes, destroy fuel and ammunition stocks, encircle large groups of UAF troops and grind them in cauldrons using high-precision weapons from long distances. This is a battle of attrition.

Information shows that more than 70% of Ukraine's resources have already been used up. Without the help of Western regions, it is impossible to replenish the loss of personnel, without the help of the West – weapons stocks, and without the supply of fuel and lubricants from Russia and Belarus, the mobility of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is impossible – fuel reserves are close to exhaustion. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are engaged in a positional war, and the transfer of forces over long distances is already problematic.

In general, the Ukrainian Armed Forces no longer have a strategic plan for the campaign. The control of the troops is disrupted, there are conflicts between the commanders and the command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the nationalist battalions. Fights of local importance arise here during the attack of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Russian rear columns of second-echelon reserves, cleansing operations or reconnaissance activities.

It is obvious that the acute phase of military operations will last for another two or three weeks, at least until the end of March, a radical change will occur, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a single military institution will cease to exist. The campaign will turn into finishing off the remnants of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in giant cauldrons around Mariupol, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Kiev, and the fate of these cities will be decided through a combination of military operations and negotiations.

In any case, the cities are likely to fall during March, as there is no long-term potential for confrontation there. Experts expressed the point of view about turning these encircled enclaves into analogues of the Syrian Raqqa, Mosul and Idlib. But the blockade of these Syrian cities was not complete. All of Assad's opponents were specifically moved to Idlib, so the opposition forces there were able to receive supplies from outside. This prevented a humanitarian catastrophe there.

In the case of large encircled cities in Ukraine, this scenario will not be applied. The cities will be completely blocked, and supplies will be provided only under Russian control and in exchange for the evacuation of the population. After that, there will be either an assault, or acceptance of the surrender of the UAF.

The end of the active military phase of the operation should occur during March, at maximum the first ten days of April, and will mean the beginning of the cleansing of giant enclaves. At this stage, the resistance of the nationalists will take on the character of a partisan movement using sabotage and subversive methods. This phase can last a year or a year and a half.

As life stabilises under the influence of the new government's policies and denazification processes, insurgency will be criminalised. The partisan movement of nationalists will disintegrate, turning into criminal gangs of looters and robbers.

At this stage, their connection with the local population will weaken, and the process of decomposition will begin within the gangs. The underground leadership will seek salvation in cooperation with the federal government, after which the insurgency will come to naught.

Along this path in Ukraine, under the USSR, the struggle against the Banderist underground was already taking place, the complete defeat of which came ten years after the end of the Great Patriotic War. There is reason to believe that in the upcoming war between Russia and the West over Ukraine, the stages and timing of denazification will not significantly differ from the historical counterpart.

The elimination of Chechen gangs and overcoming the consequences of the civil war in Chechnya took a shorter time due to the smaller size of the conflict area and a smaller population.

In Ukraine, as a result of 30 years of US domination, the Banderisation of the population has gone beyond the borders of Western Ukraine and reached an unprecedented scale. The number and quality of the littered territories make the problem of the denazification of Ukraine closer to the problem of denazification of Germany, where it was also only superficially possible to overcome the consequences of Nazism in a decade.

In the USSR, the consequences of the Civil War were also overcome in ten years. All this gives grounds to predict the solution of the main problems of the denazification of Ukraine in the ten-year period after the end of the military campaign and the creation of new authorities on its current territory. Given the fact that the collective West will be involved in supporting the Banderist underground in Ukraine, the terms of denazification may become more flexible, as it will be necessary to fight on the external and internal fronts.

The problem for Russia will be the lack of an ideological project for the future integration of Ukraine into the common space with Russia and Belarus. Under the USSR, the integration of nations (as far as the GDR and as close as Ukraine) took place on the basis of the Soviet ideological project. It had a powerful energy and a clear value matrix.

In the current situation, Russia contrasts the clear and powerful nationalist construct of Ukraine with an indistinct ideology, where different ideologemes are mixed, often conflicting with each other. The development of ideological support for a military operation is significantly lagging behind the pace of its implementation.

Russia is entering a Banderised Ukraine without alternative ideological symbols. In some places, the use of Soviet flags was observed, but neither Soviet nostalgia, nor flags of Russia, nor flags of the republics of the L/DPR can serve as a means of counter-propaganda in Ukraine, where propagandised elements of the population come out to meet the Russian army with flags of Ukraine and the EU.

The information war is a war of symbols with ideas behind them. Russia does not have any bright symbols and ideas in this war, since the vague concept of anti-fascism is not the idea with which to conduct successful counter-propaganda in Ukraine, and the ideas of Slavic unity and economic integration in Ukraine are listed below the ideas of Euro-association and national exclusivity.

This situation is caused by the fact that in Russia itself, at the time of the start of the military operation, the ideological dispute between the conditional "Westerners and Slavophiles", supporters of sovereignty and globalism, was not completed. The military operation caused a powerful surge of patriotism, but the ideological design of the future is literally on wheels, and the advance of Russian troops in Ukraine is accompanied by the suppression of the fifth column in Russia and the defeat of its institutions in the media, economy and government institutions.

The nationalisation of elites in Russia is at an early stage, which affects the lack of a single ideological and political justification for military propaganda during the military actions of Russia and the West in Ukraine. After all, it is still not clear whether we will return to close ties with the West after the end of the operation or not, and it is not clear to what extent the ideological constructions of the current stage of the conflict should be radical. After all, anti-Westernism is not an ideology, but only a reason for its creation.

However, the scale of the confrontation, its intensity and structure suggest that Russia and the West have moved to the "War of Annihilation” stage of conflict. It turned out that the EU is much more aggressive than the US. This came as a surprise to the Russian establishment, for which integration into Europe has been a top priority for 30 years.

The aggressiveness of the EU has launched the most irrational ways of war with Russia. This does not take into account self-harm, the main thing is to damage Russia at any cost. This is shown by the unprecedented economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, combined with an all-out information and political war.

The military component of NATO is also increasingly involved, but it is held back only by Russia's nuclear potential.

Thus, the operational and tactical level of the confrontation between Russia and the West on the territory of Ukraine during the military campaign flows into a strategic one, which has global consequences, and, consequently, world-historical significance, comparable only to the victory of the USSR in World War II and the collapse of the USSR at the end of the 20th century.

First and foremost, because Russia is now demonstrating the ability to nullify the geopolitical prizes of the West that it won as a result of winning the Cold War, and to regain control over the post-Soviet territories that were lost and passed under the protectorate of the West. And the once all-powerful West is demonstrating its inability to hold these prizes and is facing an existential challenge.

2. Problem statement

In fact, we are talking about a new global redistribution of zones of influence in the world, called the "Second Yalta". However, before such a new agreement is concluded, all parties to the conflict and all centres of power will fight desperately to maintain or improve their declared positions. This period of total upheaval and war has the following characteristics.

With the loss of control over Ukraine by the West, the process of "falling dominoes" is launched – a chain reaction of global transformations. The world of Pax Americana, which began to take shape at the end of the 19th century and developed between 1944 and 1973 (the Bretton Woods and Jamaica Conferences), is deeply shaken. This world is still at the peak of its power.

However, signs of its decline are beginning to show. This is expressed in the inability to maintain the leading pace of economic development, to protect dominance on the outskirts of the Empire, and to prevent enemies from conspiring against the hegemon. First of all, the cultural appeal of the metropolis is lost, it ceases to be an unquestionable authority and an ideal for imitation of the colonies. The United States has entered an era of deep soft power crisis.

Now, in the terminology of Sun Tzu, their goals can only be achieved in the most flawed way – "storming fortresses", since the path of deception is no longer available to them, and it is no longer possible to break the enemy's plans, alliances and intentions, as before. The countries that were once called the "Third World" are gaining a growing ambition for subjectivity, and this is turning from a lone-man revolt into a whole movement led by China and Russia.

To begin with, the very fact that Russia dared to challenge the United States militarily in Ukraine is regarded around the world as an unequivocal defeat of the United States. The fact that the US response is possible only as an economic and information war is the second proof of the growing weakness of the hegemon. It is frantically trying to maintain the consolidation of vassals.

The success of Russia's military operation in Ukraine marks the beginning of the largest global redistribution of spheres of influence in the world in 200 years. It is the largest because it includes countries that lost the status of empires after the First World War and were considered losers: Turkey, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, as well as countries that lost the status of empires after the Second World War: Great Britain, Russia-USSR and new contenders for leadership: China, India, Iran.

Russia participates in all three of these groups and is therefore a key contender for scrapping the post-war American-centric system. The transformations that began as a result of the impending defeat of the West in Ukraine are as follows.

3. Conclusions

1. The Turkey Factor

Russia's victory in the battle for Ukraine puts Turkey in a dangerous position and therefore is extremely unprofitable for it. Turkey is losing the opportunity to play on the contradictions between Russia and the West in the Ukrainian bridgehead, where it has been increasing its influence and thus supporting the growth of influence in Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Separately, it is necessary to note the complete collapse of the potential of Turkey's game in Crimea. That is, the loss of pro-Western subjectivity by Ukraine pushes Turkey into submission to the United States and calls into question the neo-Ottoman project.

Disturbing "calls" for Erdogan in Transcaucasia have already begun. After the almost complete absorption of Azerbaijan by Turkey, Russia first reduced the role of Ankara in the region, excluding it from the list of participants in the Karabakh settlement. The second blow was struck by Aliyev, who showed an instant reaction and excellent flair, arriving in Moscow during the start of Russia's military operation in Ukraine and concluding a Declaration of Allied Cooperation with it. Formally, this is not a betrayal of Erdogan by Aliyev – before signing the Declaration with Russia, Aliyev signed the same Declaration on Allied Partnership with Turkey.

Now Azerbaijan's positions are formally balanced. But in fact, this means recognising that Aliyev cannot imagine Azerbaijan without an alliance with Russia. This is a low blow for Turkey, which aspires to monopolise its influence on Azerbaijan.

However, Turkey also benefits from the situation. By blocking the Bosphorus for all ships, including NATO, to pass through, it increases its influence on the United States and indirectly provides a service to Russia. In return, Turkey immediately launches an artillery war in Syria, while Russia is occupied by Ukraine and cannot plant reserves on the Syrian front.

Turkey's tactical gains are matched by its strategic losses. First of all, now its position in Central Asia will become weaker. Any attempts to get closer to the United States will activate the opposition in Turkey, which believes that such a rapprochement threatens the neo-Ottoman project in Eurasia.

There is another advantage for Turkey in the victory of Russia in Ukraine. With a pro-American Ukraine (in or near NATO), the entire Black Sea region becomes the domain of NATO, that is, the United States. At the same time, Turkey's influence is decreasing. With a neutral Ukraine, the importance of Turkey increases. It starts receiving offers from all key geopolitical players.

But in sum, the balance of benefits and losses for Turkey under a neutral Ukraine is rather negative. Turkey can only compensate for this by withdrawing from NATO and gaining a neutral status. This puts Turkey in a fairly strong position as a stabiliser of turbulence in all key regions, and this has a great chance of increasing its influence. The Turkish establishment is aware of this, as it is also aware that Turkey is not yet ready for such a step.

But the more time passes, the greater the damage to Turkey from such indecision. Disputes within the Turkish establishment will only grow. In any case, rapprochement between Turkey and the United States will be forced and undesirable for Turkey. At the first opportunity, it will certainly try to restore distance. In other words, the United States will never gain reliable control over Turkey in light of the loss of influence in Ukraine in favour of Russia.

2. The China Factor

Russia's victory in Ukraine helps China (PRC) achieve reunification with Taiwan. Some experts even believe that a military operation of the PRC in Taiwan is possible almost in May of this year, they say, the global crisis will bring down economic growth in China, and to prevent outbursts of discontent, Xi Jinping will undertake a victorious war in Taiwan.

These predictions are incorrect. China is carefully studying the Western response to Russia's actions, but an operation in Taiwan will mean such severe global economic shocks that China is not yet ready for. The southern regions of China will suffer, as the inevitable naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait will paralyse the ports concentrated here. 75% of China's trade is carried out by sea.

The Taiwan operation for China is now unprofitable also because in 2024 the issue of accession in general can be decided peacefully. Elections will be held there, where the victory of the party, which in Russia is called the Kuomintang, is expected.

This party supports the unification of China and Taiwan, which is opposed by the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan, affiliated with the US Democratic Party. It provokes China to take military action, demonstrating the desire for separatism. The US is pushing China into a military conflict with Taiwan, just as it pushed Russia into the same conflict with Ukraine.

In any case, the strengthening of Russia as a result of the Ukrainian campaign further closes off Central Asia from the United States and its allies, accelerating the process of distancing local states from American influence and increasing the influence of the Russian-Chinese alliance here.

3. The Europe Factor

The EU, as a result of the loss of Ukraine and the strengthening of Russia, faces the threat of the most severe crisis in its entire history. First of all, Europe agrees to the enormous costs of curtailing trade projects with Russia and complete subordination to the United States. This is fraught with a crisis of the ruling parties in the EU and a conflict between the establishment and the business community.

Euroscepticism will increase as the euro weakens and the EU's budget crisis looms. Britain's destabilising role will face resistance from France and Germany. As a result, opposition parties in Europe can strengthen their positions and push out the traditional European pool of pro-American parties.

In the EU, there is a reason for the conflict between the completely pro-American European bureaucracy and the leaders of Western European countries. They now stand in solidarity with the United States and organise anti-Russian marches in Europe. This consolidates the electorate and prevents the opposition from scoring points on criticism. Europe is militarising on the rise of military anti-Russian hysteria.

But the United States creates its alliances as military-commercial ones. Trade in the EU suffers the most as a result of US policy. The elites of France and Germany do not have a sufficient military component outside of NATO and therefore are now putting the base under the need for the development of European armed forces. When things start to calm down, and this will happen in a year or two, the power resource created now will be useful to Germany and France. Their conflict of interest with the United Kingdom and the United States has faded into the shadows, but it hasn't gone away.

Russia's victory in Ukraine will make the continuation of sanctions meaningless. The anti-Russian sanctions consensus will collapse. The first person to challenge it will gain significant competitive advantages and gain a strong position in the EU. Especially in the context of a growing structural crisis due to rising prices for energy, fertilisers and food.

The seizure of Europe by the United States on the occasion of Ukraine's return to the bosom of Russian influence will be temporary. If the military operation ends in March, and the political process of forming a new Ukraine begins, the West will need to participate in it, and this will make sanctions a hindrance.

Whatever it was, the former subject of Ukraine is no longer there, and therefore there is no point in forcing Russia to return something to Ukraine. The new Ukraine means new subjects of international law. The old sanctions should be lifted and we should sit down at the negotiating table on the "New Yalta".

The end of military operations in Ukraine and the beginning of curtailing the sanctions process will lead to the fact that by the end of this summer, the main sanctions in the form of restrictions on trade, financial settlements and transport connectivity may be mostly lifted. Europe's economic interests will demand this, and the West will be able to justify "saving face".

Only US demands not to send a bad signal to China regarding Taiwan can prevent the unblocking of the main sanctions package against Russia. Allegedly, in Beijing they can finally believe that the West "does not judge the winner" and will not want to harm itself for a long time.

This will delay the process of agreeing on the terms of a new European security architecture, where the United States will seek to play the main role and solve everything without Europe and for Europe. Including the issue of lifting sanctions. The US will impose permanent sanctions on Europe.

If the Chinese factor influences the decision to end European sanctions against Russia by the end of the summer, then this issue will be postponed to the beginning of 2023. By then, China will have an election for the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee, and if Xi Jinping wins, the EU will realise that it is pointless to delay any further.

All the major developments have taken place, the European security architecture is not waiting, and it is time to negotiate with Russia and China. The pendulum will swing in the other direction: the growing alliance in the East must be negotiated before it becomes so strong that it becomes unyielding.

At this point, everyone will be concerned about how to help the United States "save face”. China has already taken a step in this direction: it has invited the United States to find a place in the Belt and Road project. It is possible that this will be a condition of compromise on the "New Yalta". If the US accepts this proposal, the biggest casualty will be the UK. There will be practically no place for its interests in the new world.

4. The Union State, BRICS and EAEU factor

Russia's military operation in Ukraine is a link in the chain of strategic planning for the reconstruction of the territories of the former USSR. The creation of a new alliance is fully consistent with the requirement to finally solve the problem of the NATO threat to Russia and its allies, who, in the absence of security guarantees, solve survival problems by a multi-vector approach, without having the resources to preserve their sovereignty over the West. This translates into the capitulation and development of the republics by global transnational corporations.

That is, in fact, all the republics of the former USSR in a state of disintegration and "parade of sovereignty" are turning into colonies of the West, including Russia. First of all, because there is no possibility to create a single market for the development of industries that ensure technological sovereignty.

The liberation of Ukraine creates prerequisites for the creation in 2028 of a Union State in the format of the Eurasian Union on the technical basis of the EAEU. By 2028, Ukraine will take shape as a geopolitical entity that has passed the main stages of denazification and is capable of integration with other EAEU states. The new political system of Belarus will also take shape. In Russia, a presidential election will be held, and the vertical of power will be optimised.

Here there are grounds for returning to the topic of the Slavic Union of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Brzezinski said that such an alliance is impossible as long as Ukraine remains a Western springboard.

In the new reality, the path to the Slavic Union can be considered open. But here I must say that the Slavic Union is possible only without taking into account the possibility of an alliance with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states. And here the Slavic Union has its drawbacks.

In general, the topic of the Slavic Union was first formulated by A. Solzhenitsyn. He saw it as a way to push back the Asian republics and create the Union's capital in Minsk. In this form, the idea of Solzhenitsyn, an author who has already been sufficiently compromised, is a form of consolidating the disintegration of the USSR and a blow primarily to Russia.

Not only is the centre of such an alliance shifted to the West, turning Moscow into a province, and Minsk into a "bridge" that is regulated by the West, but the Union itself, in the context of growing nationalism in Belarus and Ukraine, becomes a form of pressure on Russia to transform it into an appendage of the West. That is, in the Solzhenitsyn format, the Slavic Union is a bad idea.

In the USSR, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan combined to account for 80% of the USSR's GDP. Now Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are integrated in the EAEU format. If Russia, Ukraine and Belarus now formalise a variant of the Slavic Union as the core of the Union State, and then invite Kazakhstan to join this state, then it will feel like an unequal union. Three Slavic states and one Turkic state - Kazakhstan will not understand this and will not accept it.

Therefore, now it is more expedient to start creating a Union State after completing a number of preparatory procedures without registering the Slavic Union as an intermediate link. So that the Union does not have an opposition of two blocs – Slavic and Turkic. The EAEU can become the technical base of the Union State. If Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan make such a decision, then all other former Soviet republics will eventually catch up to the Union and formalise relations with it of varying degrees of association.

Azerbaijan was the first such initiator. It will not join the Union State, but will conclude a treaty of cooperation and friendship with it. If it is a confederation, then Azerbaijan will not be hindered from joining either. After the start of military operations in Ukraine, Georgia sharply reduced its anti-Russian rhetoric and refused to participate in sanctions.

The inclusion of Ukraine in the Union State will leave Georgia no choice but to join it. Moldova will face the same question. Neither the EU nor NATO will accept it. Dependence on Russia and the Union State will affect the geopolitical orientation of Moldova, where pro-Western forces will be pushed back.

As a result, we see the beginning of trends towards the reunification of the fragments of the former USSR and a chain reaction of the weakening of the United States with its system of trade and military alliances aimed at Western hegemony.

Another wake-up call has come in: the US has spent a lot of effort on bringing India into its camp. As a result, when Russia was sanctioned, India held direct talks with Moscow with a request not to stop Russian fertiliser exports to India (two-thirds of fertilisers there are from Russia and there is nothing to replace them with).

For this purpose, they even offered to open clearing accounts – ruble accounts in India and for rupees in Russia. This is a blow to the US dollar. India did not support anti-Russian sanctions, and in desperation, the US Congress proposed punishing India with sanctions for acquiring Russian air defence systems. That is, in the Indian direction, the Russian operation in Ukraine is turning into a disaster for the United States.

5. The Middle East Factor

Saudi Arabia did not support sanctions against Russia and demonstrates anti-American rhetoric. Rising oil prices make cooperation with Russia a key factor for the UAE. Yemen supported Russia. The pro-Russian position was taken by Iran, sympathetic Iraq, Syria supported Russia, recognising the L/DPR. Israel, interested in preserving the current Russophobic Ukraine, received another point of conflict with the Persians and Arabs.

In other words, the conflict between Russia and the West in Ukraine has split the world even more than before. The US’ position in the Middle East can only be maintained through pressure and a demonstration of the threat of force. Russia and China are splitting the Middle East and tearing away the zones of influence of the United States and Great Britain, forming a pool of states that are neutral towards the United States. Given that these states were previously to varying degrees pro-American, their neutrality now means a move towards anti-Americanism. In the face of China and Russia, they have an alternative.

6. The Africa Factor

Africa, even before the start of Russia's military operation in Ukraine, shows a growing trend of pro-Russian sympathies. China has already gained a very deep foothold in Africa, and the trends that the events in Ukraine entail lead to further strengthening of these positions. The West will respond to this by all means of confrontation, except nuclear.

7. The Latin American Factor

The strengthening of Russia and China will lead to an aggravation of the fight with the United States in Latin America. The belt of anti-American states represented by Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba will receive support, and Brazil and Argentina will experience increased US pressure to prevent their movements towards Russia and China.

In general, anti-colonial instincts directed against the United States, which were active under the USSR, will awaken in Latin America. Such an impulse will arise on the continent only after Russia launches a military operation in Ukraine. What happens after its successful completion, for the United States, is the nightmare of the return of the USSR. In the long run, this is how they see the situation.

8. Transfer factor

In general, the changes brought to life by Russia's military operation in Ukraine are not only long-term in nature, but also have world-historical significance. The world is divided into trade and technological blocs that will protect their markets and sovereignty by all means, including nuclear forces. The collapse of the USSR created a power vacuum in the place of its existence. The United States tried to fill it, and it seemed that they succeeded. Russia's actions after 30 years have shown that this is an illusion.

Processes have begun, where Russia, the United States, India and China will play the main role. The EU is losing its subjectivity. Whatever the outcome of the Chinese election (and Xi Jinping has all the chances there), Russia needs to maintain the contour of power under Vladimir Putin. Prerequisites are being created for the transition to a new technological order. Changing the leaders of key states during this period is impractical, as it can jeopardise all unfinished processes.