The new geopolitics of Transcaucasia: ousting the US from the region may become a reality
When, after a meeting in Istanbul in mid-November between the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Andrey Rudenko, and Turkey, Sedat Önal, reports appeared that the parties were preparing to launch the 3+3 cooperation format (Russia, Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) in Transcaucasia, few believed that the negotiation process in this direction would become intensive. Everyone recalled how Ankara came up with a project to create a new regional security system after the Caucasian war in August 2008.
At that time, there was a lot of talk about this at various levels and even some efforts were made. Turkish media reported that the historical triangle Turkey-Russia-Iran is returning to Transcaucasia and the process of forming a new regional security system with the participation of these countries, but without the United States and Europe, is beginning. But then the project was rejected by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.
In response, Ankara proposed a second option, in the "five" format ("3+2"), although a little later Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that "the UN should also take part in the negotiations, not the EU and the United States”. In our case, the historical parallel seems appropriate because Erdogan returned to his Caucasian scenario after the second Karabakh war, as a result of which Azerbaijan regained control of previously lost areas, and a contingent of Russian peacekeepers appeared in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Another important factor: Russia and Iran support the Turkish project, as do Azerbaijan and Armenia. Tbilisi opposed it because of Moscow's participation in the format and the absence of the United States and the EU in it. This removes the feeling that "everything is being done in a hurry" and that Turkey's initiative is, as some claim, "hasty and imperfect”. If this were the case, then Russia, formally participating in this process, could "quietly sabotage" it. This doesn't happen.
On the contrary, Moscow is actually taking part in the reanimation of the geopolitical historical Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle in Transcaucasia, potentially considering it as the main guarantor of regional security.
At the suggestion of Russia, the format is given the status of an advisory body for solving regional problems in the context of a kind of continuation of the agreements reached on November 9, 2020 to end the second Karabakh war. And the first meeting (though without the participation of Georgia) at the level of deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia was held in Moscow.
According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, "the parties discussed prospects for the development of multidimensional regional cooperation" in order to "focus the work of the platform on practical issues of interest to all its participants”. At the same time, the consultative format of diplomatic communications chosen by the parties expands opportunities for the multi-faceted manoeuvring of all its participants.
If this mechanism is successful, both the status of representation in such forums will increase and the scale of decisions taken will expand with a narrowing of the problem field. This is how Moscow, Ankara and Tehran indicate the possibility of a radical reversal of their foreign policy and demonstrate their readiness to form coalitions. At the same time, it takes time to understand how much their individual actions are dictated by the situational factor, which, in principle, cannot be excluded.
Iranian Ambassador to Ankara Mohammad Farazmand said that "this initiative will help the region solve problems, minimise hotbeds of tension, expand cooperation and create a powerful region through synergy between neighbouring states”. According to him, this way "opens up broad horizons of political, trade, economic and transport cooperation for the countries of the region”.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the strategic scale and vector of new changes in Transcaucasia is still being formed. Today, it is no longer possible to consider this space only as a post-Soviet space, as was customary among Western politicians over the past three decades.
But it is one thing to promote closer security ties with Transcaucasia and strengthen its capacity to resist Western pressure, and quite another to integrate into the growing network of regional ties with countries located along their southern perimeter.
Relations with these countries are developing most dynamically: trade growth rates are increasing, economic ties are expanding, energy markets are changing, and prospects for implementing new infrastructure projects are opening up.
At the same time, it turns out that Russia has to almost reassert its role in the region in the situation, while Turkey and Iran have made significant progress in this direction. Therefore, it is time to take a fresh look at Russia's Caucasian policy in general, as well as its relations with Turkey and Iran.
Memories of the past
Transcaucasia can be considered a unique region, both ethnically and geopolitically. The relatively compact territory of the Caucasus is home to over 50 ethnic groups that profess various religions and confessions. This region is at the centre of attention of major regional countries such as Russia, Turkey and Iran, which have influenced the region to varying degrees in different historical periods.
This has left its mark on the processes that are taking place in the region to this day. This is the very situation when there is no getting away from it, because relations between Russia, Turkey and Iran are burdened with a centuries-old history of conflicts and wars. Even in the pre-Soviet era, the Caucasus was a territory where the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires clashed over land and influence.
Each of the empires at some time dominated this region. After defeating the Ottoman Empire and Iran, the Russian Empire managed to attach to itself the North Caucasus and the territories currently occupied by Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Transcaucasian countries, like all others in the post-Soviet space, perceived a new opportunity to realise their national interests. In Transcaucasia, the historical matrix of the region, represented in addition to Russia, again by Turkey and Iran, began to be recreated. The newly independent states of Transcaucasia - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia - after the dismantling of the socialist system began to pursue a policy separate from Moscow.
This process was received with great enthusiasm in Turkey, which was one of the first countries to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Iran was less enthusiastic about the collapse of the Soviet Union. As for Russia, understanding the historical inevitability of Turkey and Iran marking their interests in the region, it tried to maintain military-political parity there. This is still possible despite the defeat of Armenia in the second Karabakh war.
Nevertheless, this war sharply marked the factor of Turkey, which provided support to Azerbaijan, and expanded its influence in this region. Based on the ethnic proximity, the Turkish and Azerbaijani authorities practically implement the idea of "bir millet iki devlet” ("one nation, two states") and create integration structures for the formation of the "Turkic world".
Iran also has its own interests in the region. They have certain specifics. based on Shia Islam. In this country, the state ideology is dominated by "Khomeinism", which does not recognise the existence of an ethnic and national issue in a single Islamic community - the Ummah. Nevertheless, given the growing influence of Turkey and its military-political alliance with Azerbaijan, Tehran is seriously concerned about the problems of potential separatism on the part of Azerbaijanis living in the north of the country.
At the same time, it should be noted that the confrontation with Sunni Turkey in Shiite Iran is not built purely on religious and ideological motives, but this factor significantly affects their relations. For example, Shiism is the dominant religion in Azerbaijan, which undoubtedly brings it closer to Iran, but culturally, ethnically and linguistically, the Republic of Azerbaijan still gravitates towards Turkey.
It is also important that Iran, like Russia, took a neutral position in the Karabakh conflict, which was due to Iran's unwillingness to strengthen the positions of Azerbaijan, and accordingly Turkey. Thus, it becomes clear that, despite the apparent religious orientation of Iran, in matters of foreign policy, the Islamic Republic prefers a pragmatic and balanced position.
As for Russia, over the past 20 years, Russia has significantly reduced the level of its presence in the Caucasus. For some time, global and regional players have been trying to fill the political vacuum, which has created three distinct trends in the region's development so far.
The first is the internationalisation of the Caucasus under the auspices of the United States, NATO, and global international organisations. Regional actors in this case could be out of work, and therefore this option is categorically not accepted by Turkey and Iran.
The second is competition for influence in the Transcaucasus between the main regional powers, primarily Turkey, Russia and Iran, but with the involvement of global players. Many Russian experts perceive this option as the only one that exists and is possible.
However, such a situation cannot be acceptable for Russia and the peoples of Transcaucasia, as it entails permanent instability. The third trend remains - regional cooperation based on good neighbourliness, mutual trust and integration.
The high level of modern relations between Russia, Turkey and Iran may well become the basis for such interaction, but the informal leader of the region will be the state that will propose a working scheme for new regional cooperation. Moscow is already proposing a fully-fledged integration doctrine in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union, and the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh will continue to ensure peace and stability on its southern borders.
But its continued military presence in this region is built in the wake of strengthening the existing military-technical agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Kremlin's active Transcaucasian policy of restoring its influence so far is largely due to concern about the unpredictability of the consequences of an alternative course of events.
Here is another important factor influencing the course of events in the region. Transcaucasia did not long remain at the centre of American foreign policy. The US has withdrawn from Afghanistan and is withdrawing from Iraq, turning from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific region. The fact that the West has turned its back on Transcaucasia is not a purely American phenomenon.
The European Union has done the same – because of general fatigue with EU enlargement policies, the war in Ukraine, and internal problems including Brexit and the European debt crisis.
Thus ends the period of the US’ presence in Transcaucasia, which many experts call "the historical anomaly of the beginning of the post-Soviet era”. Geographically, the region is significantly remote from America, and the strategic importance of the states located there, from the point of view of Washington, was associated with their transition from Soviet power to a new form of government.
Conclusions.
Geopolitically, Transcaucasia is undergoing a transition period. Having ceased to be a remote outskirts of the Soviet Union, this region is now connected to a much larger number of regions of the world, being under their influence and interacting with them. The interdependence of the South Caucasus states and their neighbours in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf is growing.
These countries are opening up their historical geography, filling the vacuum created after the collapse of the USSR with dark cross-border relations not only with Russia, but also with the countries of the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Asia. At the same time, all three external players - Russia, Turkey, and Iran - are sovereign, are members of the UN and other international organisations, and cooperate with other countries in political, strategic, economic, and cultural fields.
But there is a positional difference between them. If Russia is trying to maintain its influence in the region, then Turkey and Iran are developing a new space for themselves, although they are the oldest participant in the Caucasian "Great Game" and demonstrate their desire to play serious geopolitical games.
Given this important circumstance, the geopolitical processes currently taking place in the region are complex and contradictory, and the influence of these factors on the socio-political processes in the Transcaucasian region is high. Ultimately, it is under their influence that a new geopolitical configuration is being formed here, beyond the control of the United States, although NATO influence is formally preserved through the factor of Turkey. But it is also a fact that changes in the political strategy of Turkey and Iran towards rapprochement with Russia are a consequence of US policy.
This is a kind of transition period, during which the most unexpected, seemingly impossible geopolitical alliances and associations arise and may still arise, dictated by the balance of power and the interests of each of the three countries' own security. This is precisely the conclusion that suggests itself for the prospects of developing trilateral relations between Russia, Turkey and Iran in the interests of the security of the Middle East region as a whole.
As a result of creating such a triple coalition, the geometry of the entire region may change. In this regard, the French publication Atlantico wrote that "far from Europe, important events are unfolding, the meaning of which is that Russia, Turkey and Iran are promoting their pieces on the chessboard in order to bring the Eurasian space out of American control”.
According to Atlantico, "if such a geopolitical experiment is successful, we can talk about a global strategic revolution”. Its main meaning is as follows. No matter how we look at it, in the Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle, Russia has a leading role in the distribution of responsibility and on the shoulders of other members of the alliance.
Those experts who say that "Russia has broken into the list of countries that currently play a significant role in the Middle East" and this “was difficult to imagine a few years ago” are right, although objectively there are real contradictions between the three sides. In other words, the alliance formed between the three countries, at least for now, is of a tactical nature.
As for the strategic prospects, for example, for the Russian-Turkish alliance in the Middle East, they are viewed very vaguely, in contrast to the Russian-Iranian prospects. But the Turkish-Iranian contradictions are well-known-they are geopolitical, economic, and inter-confessional in nature.
Ankara and Tehran have made a tactical rapprochement of their positions in order to gain time and initiate a peace process in the Middle East. Their military-political cooperation contributes to the settlement of the Syrian crisis, the effective fight against ISIS, and Russia and Turkey in reaching a peace agreement on November 9, 2020 in Karabakh.
Ankara decided to create the Moscow-Ankara-Tehran axis primarily because all three countries have repeatedly stressed their commitment to the territorial integrity of Syria. This was not prevented even by the fact that Russia maintained regular contact with Kurdish leaders, invited them to participate in inter-Syrian negotiations, and even opened a representative office of the Syrian Kurds in Moscow (April 2015).
The most important argument in favour of rapprochement with Russia was that Russia considers the Kurds to be an integral part of Syrian society and does not support the division of Syria and the formation of a separate Kurdish territory. Russia, in turn, has taken advantage of the deterioration in relations between Turkey and the United States to influence the Turkish position on the issue of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is also concerned about Kurdish territorial gains in northern Syria.
Moreover, this format of cooperation allowed Ankara to achieve two main goals in the region: to prevent the unification of the three Kurdish cantons and to liberate Northern Syria from ISIS.
Thus, the emerging geopolitical context in the Transcaucasian region is quite transparent. Iran's ambitions have historically been directed towards the Persian Gulf. But the role of the Transcaucasian region was and remains high for Iran. Moreover, 80-million-strong Iran, which has one of the most numerous armies in the world (about 900,000 people), objectively, regardless of any external and internal political situation, is an active participant in political processes, both on a regional and global scale.
Today, Iran is surrounded. If not by enemies, then, in any case, by foes or even potential opponents. The main enemy - the United States ("big Satan") - concentrated its military power from almost three sides: from the west - in Iraq, from the east - in Afghanistan, from the south - in the Persian and Oman Gulfs, on the bases and ships of the US Central Command.
On the other side of the Persian Gulf are the "wrong Muslim regimes": Sunni Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are very wary of their Shiite neighbour and, of course, do not consider Iran as an ally. And, finally, in the Middle East, the role of Israel is essential - this, in Iranian terminology, "little Satan", which Iran denies the right to exist at all.
Turkey has stopped fearing threats of rejection from the United States and the EU and does not show sensitivity to possible sanctions from the Americans for the purchase of Russian air defence systems. At the same time, Ankara boldly escalates its relations with France, Israel, Greece, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Thus, Turkey, like Iran, is virtually surrounded on all sides by detractors. France, Greece and Italy are trying to push Turkey away from the riches of the Eastern Mediterranean by weakening it economically. And if the Turks show weakness, it will also affect Russian economic interests in this difficult but important region.
In the alliance of Russia, Turkey and Iran and in their interaction with China, countries will be able to control the sea and land routes from Asia to Europe without looking at the interests of the United States and individual European players.
If the United States until recently pursued a policy of ousting Russia from Transcaucasia and blocking Iran, then Turkey, which until recently was a strategic partner of the United States and the West as a whole, opted for rapprochement with Iran and Russia. At the same time, it is becoming a fact that Moscow, Ankara and Tehran have more and more common interests in the economy, politics, and most importantly, in the security sphere. There is even an analogy with the current relationship between the "historical enemies" of France and Germany.
In the foreseeable future, this is more of a "club of interests” than a strategic axis, but if it is filled with real content, and most importantly, is effective in solving regional problems, then the troika's interaction can really develop into a more serious format. The most important condition for this is the coincidence of interests, and it is obvious. Regular contact between the heads of state in the triangle takes place and will be filled with concrete content.
Even those Turkish publications that are skeptical about the establishment of an "axis with Eurasia", such as the Daily Sabah, write that "the country was driven to this by its Western allies who ignored Turkey's interests”. Now, according to this publication, "the best thing Washington can do is stop trying to persuade Turkey to stop rapprochement with Iran and Russia”.
Russia, Turkey, and Iran were empires before they became nation states. Like the Western empires, and unlike China, they have lost most of the territories they once ruled. However, the scale of the reduction of territories was not as significant as in the case of Western European empires, and they still retain elements of their former imperial role.
The imperial past was not completely rejected by them, it remains part of their national psychologies. In Turkey, as in Iran and Russia, domestic and foreign policy are mostly determined by their ambiguous relations with the West and globalisation, and the similarity of their experience indicates that they are able to understand each other's behaviour and concerns quite well.
With this advantage in hand, they can quickly move from conflict to cooperation. But if this alliance develops into a fully-fledged alliance, the consequences for world geopolitics may be revolutionary.