Iraq in a protracted crisis: months, years or decades?
After the parliamentary elections in Iraq, it would seem that there will be a stable government that will take active steps to restore order in the country. However, these hopes were not fulfilled, and since the beginning of the year, Iraq has been gripped by a new political crisis.
On February 9, the Coordination Structure of Iraq proposed a three-point initiative aimed at breaking the political impasse in which the country found itself. The alliance of Shiite parties called on all political factions and national figures in a statement to "communicate and engage in dialogue to fulfil constitutional obligations” and called on the largest political bloc to "agree on the criteria for choosing a strong and effective prime minister”.
"We declare our full readiness to positively interact with all proposals, ideas and visions that will be presented by our partners at home, with whom we have the same destiny. We must all do our best to serve the Iraqis as a people who have suffered a lot over the past period," the statement said. The structure also announced that it was extending its hand to "the political forces that make up the largest parliamentary bloc, especially the Sadrist movement."
Earlier, on February 5, representatives of the Sadrist bloc announced that they had suspended all negotiations on the formation of the Iraqi government and called for a boycott of the parliamentary session on presidential elections. The Sadrist movement, led by prominent Shiite figure Muqtada al-Sadr, formed the largest parliamentary bloc in the elections that took place on October 21 last year, winning 73 out of 329 seats in parliament.
And the vote in parliament to elect the president on February 7 was canceled due to the presence of only 58 out of 329 deputies, which is less than the required quorum of two-thirds required to elect a new head of state.
The boycott of parliament followed a Supreme Court decision disqualifying former Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari as a presidential candidate because of corruption allegations made in 2016 when he was finance minister. [i]
The largest political bloc, led by the Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, as well as the Sovereignty Alliance led by al-Halbousi and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, whose representative is Zebari himself, announced a boycott ahead of the session.
The presidency is largely ceremonial, but the failure to elect him casts doubt on the ability of influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to secure the appointment of a prime minister and government.
Such high-level scandals clearly do not help to solve the main problems, among which the activities of the remnants of terrorist organisations pose a significant threat. Recently, there have been attempts of reorganisation from the side of ISIS cells.
Thus, at the end of January, a group of "Desert Ghosts" became active in Anbar province, which began to organise attacks on local tribal leaders and independent politicians. It was precisely in the west of Anbar that ISIS was able to deploy and began to strike in other directions from there, both in Iraq and in Syria.
There are also problems with the foreign military presence. In addition to the US military bases located in Iraq, from Zakho to Hakurk on the west–east axis and from Avashin to Erbil on the north–south axis, Turkey has 38 military posts or bases in northern Iraq. [ii]
Earlier, Turkey's desire to destroy Kurdish militias in the Sinjar region in northern Iraq caused tension both in relations with Baghdad and with Tehran. When the Turkish armed forces launched a military operation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is considered a terrorist organisation, in Gara, northern Iraq, in February 2021, Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units deployed their forces in the Sinjar area against Turkish troops.
Of course, this caused diplomatic friction between Iran and Turkey.
It is also known that the Turks were training the combat structures of the Iraqi politician Osama al-Nujaifi "Hashd al-Watani" at the Turkish base in Bashiqa, near Mosul. Officially, Ankara claims that its troops and bases are located in northern Iraq to "fight terrorism" and maintain national security. However, Turkey also makes claims to Iraqi Sunnis.
And while the United States remains in Iraq and continues its policy of "countering Iran" in Western Asia, that is, the fight against Shiites (including Iraqi ones), Turkey views its policy as a counterweight to the so-called "Iranian influence". In this, the goals of Turkey and the United States coincide.
At the same time, as a hypothetical goal, in case of the fragmentation of Iraq, Turkey is likely to consider the possibility of annexing northern Iraq, where, according to Ankara, it has historical claims.
As for the Iraqi Government, so far its possibilities of countering Turkey's violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity are limited. And Ankara will remain a major trading partner of Baghdad with a large trade deficit to the detriment of the latter.
And the recent warming in relations between Turkey, some Gulf states and Israel may force Baghdad to recognise Turkey's presence in northern Iraq as a fait accompli.
As a result, Turkish troops in northern Iraq are deployed to fulfil three tasks: influencing the Kurdish issue and directly solving the PKK problem; strengthening Turkey's regional ambitions; and creating a bargaining chip with its Western allies. However, the latest news for Ankara is not very pleasant, although they do not have a military dimension.
According to a February 15 ruling by the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, the 2007 Oil and Gas Law governing the Kurdistan region was declared unconstitutional. This is a huge blow to the Kurdistan regional government with direct consequences for its crucial energy deals with Turkey.
Kurdistan used the law to develop its own oil and gas sector independently of Baghdad, as the governments of the region sought full independence and signed multibillion-dollar deals with international oil companies. The official justification of the Kurdistan authorities was that Baghdad did not and continues not to provide the Kurdistan region with a fair share of the national budget and oil revenues.
The court's decision is seen as related to the intrigues that unfolded in Baghdad, and, according to well-informed sources, took Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, who has very good relations with the Iraqi Kurds, by surprise. [iii]
Why is this decision not beneficial for Turkey? Since 2014, crude oil from Kurdistan has gone through a specially constructed pipeline that leads to loading terminals at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey. This gave Ankara unprecedented leverage over the semi-independent Kurdish zone, although the Turks continued to fight against the structures of the Kurdistan Workers' Party.
Baghdad has filed an arbitration claim against Turkey with the International Chamber of Commerce, which has been considering it for the eighth year. Turkey could potentially pay compensation in the amount of $24 billion to the Iraqi government. Israel was also in the share, as most of Kurdistan's crude oil is purchased by Israel on the spot market.
The court's decision states that the 2007 law violates various provisions of the constitution and declares Kurdistan's contracts with foreign countries and companies for exploration, production, export and sale invalid.
Kurdistan, officially recognised as an autonomous region of Iraq since 2005, has been developing its oil and gas resources independently of the Iraqi federal government for decades, having adopted its own oil law in 2007 to manage resources on its territory.
So far, Turkey has not officially commented on this decision, and the Kurdistan authorities have rejected it, calling it not only "unconstitutional”, but also "unfair". Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and former president of the region, said the move was an attempt to "contrast the Kurdistan region and the federal system in Iraq."
It should be added that in addition to the tension over the dispute over the independent sale of oil and gas by Kurdistan bypassing Baghdad, the situation deteriorated significantly after 2014, when the armed forces of the Kurdish Peshmerga seized control of the city of Kirkuk after ISIS militants tried to seize it. It, along with the lucrative surrounding oil fields, remained under the control of the Kurds until October 2017, when, after a controversial referendum on independence in the Kurdish region, Baghdad forcibly returned the city to federal control. [iv]
After that, as a result of a deal concluded in 2019 between Baghdad and the Kurdistan capital Erbil, the Kurds officially supplied 250,000 of the more than 400,000 barrels of oil per day to Baghdad in exchange for their share of the federal budget, which is used to pay salaries to civil servants and the armed forces. But at the same time, the Kurds continued to support contracts with foreign oil companies regardless of Baghdad - it is these agreements that are now under threat.
And judging by the experts' statement, Baghdad will win this case, because it has very strong arguments in the arbitration court in Paris.
Turkey wants a postponement because it doesn't want to be accused of a violation, which in turn would undermine its credibility in international markets as it struggles to keep its current finances afloat. Therefore, there is a dilemma for Ankara what to do next.
The only salvation seems to be a protracted political crisis in Iraq itself, since the chaos in Baghdad will be able to delay a change in the rules of the game for both Kurds and Turks. And the question arises - will Ankara act in this direction or calmly wait for the arbitration decision?
But there is another external side to the case, as the decision of the Iraqi Supreme Court was handed down the day after France's Total Energies struck a $27 billion deal with Iraq, which as Baghdad hopes could reverse the withdrawal of major oil companies from the country. It is assumed that the transaction will be finalised from March this year. Therefore, taking into account the numerous interests and contradictions, the restoration of Baghdad's sovereignty will be a difficult and slow process.
[I] https://www.arabnews.com/node/2020976/middle-east
[ii] https://thecradle.co/Article/investigations/6255
[iii] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/iraqi-courts-ruling-krg-gas-puts-turkey-spot
[iv] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-kurds-denounce-unjust-oil-gas-ruling-energy-feud