Suitcase without a handle: Is Karakalpakstan a new hot spot in Central Asia?

Tashkent is putting things in order in Karakalpakstan with a carrot and stick: President Mirziyoyev introduced a state of emergency in the republic — for a month so far — and in return promised not to change its status in the constitution of Uzbekistan.

However, unrest has already occurred in the Karakalpak capital of Nukus, people have felt the taste of street riots, and Western media rushed to scribble about "another hot spot in Central Asia”.

Another one? To understand this, it’s necessary to take into account at least three circumstances.

1. “A mine under Uzbekistan". Karakalpakstan is a special region. According to the Uzbek constitution, it is a sovereign republic, with its own flag-coat of arms-anthem. In 1993, it signed an interstate agreement for a period of 20 years on entering Uzbekistan - with the right to exit through a referendum (with the consent of the Uzbek parliament).

Such a "change of registration" is not the first for Karakalpakstan. Even at the dawn of Soviet power, it was formed as an autonomous region in the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, then entered as an  Autonomous Region directly into the RSFSR, after which it was handed over to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic as a suitcase without a handle - already on the rights of the ASSR.

At the end of the Soviet Union, Karakalpakstan proclaimed sovereignty — first as a Soviet republic within it (outside Uzbekistan), then as a separate state altogether.

2. Attention of the West. Of course, country specialists, in uniform and without, knew about these features of the republic. And recently, in specialised Western publications, the topic of Karakalpak separatism has become very actively promoted, reaching a new level with the start of protests.

Now it is designed to provide a propaganda background for foreign policy pressure on Tashkent — both directly from the "decision-making centres" in the West, and through various NGOs. The separatists are shaking the situation from their side, directly appealing to Western embassies, the UN and the OSCE.

The mantras are familiar and simple: "Karakalpakia is a poor region (due to local corruption and oppression of Tashkent). But capable of flourishing at the expense of natural resources, it is only necessary for it to separate ..."

3. Carelessness of Tashkent. The Uzbek authorities had to feel the situation and calculate all the consequences. In any case, they should have postponed or even canceled the discussion of amendments to the country's constitution that exclude the sovereignty of Karakalpakstan and its right to secede from Uzbekistan. There was no urgent need for this.

But Tashkent has backed down only now, when it is perceived as a weakness and a concession — even if the current surge of separatism is roughly suppressed.

Perhaps certain forces are still only calculating the reaction of the Uzbek authorities and preparing something new. It is only clear that the Karakalpak factor has suddenly become an important part of geopolitics in Central Asia. So unnecessarily and so at the wrong time.

Elena Panina, Director of the RUSSTRAT Institute