Turkish gambit and Kurdish pawns

    The sudden surrender of Turkey's "inflexible" positions will add instability to several regions
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    Ankara's completely unexpected 180-degree turn in relation to Sweden and Finland naturally became one of the most high-profile newsworthy information of the NATO summit held in Madrid. Contrary to previous loud statements about the unacceptability of the admission of Sweden and Finland, Turkey signed a trilateral memorandum.

    NATO acts on the basis of consensus, which means that Turkish President Recep Erdogan could block Finland and Sweden from joining the alliance if his demands were not met, which he threatened to do. It is reported that the breakthrough occurred after four hours of negotiations shortly before the start of the summit and allowed the process of including Finland and Sweden in the alliance to begin.

    Let's recall that Ankara demanded that Sweden and Finland stop supporting Kurdish armed groups, such as the PKK, and lifted bans on the sale of certain types of weapons to Turkey. The PKK, recognised as a "terrorist" group in Turkey, the European Union and the United States, has been fighting against Turkey with varying success since 1984, seeking autonomy.

    NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that the terms of the deal suggest that Sweden will step up work on Turkey's requests for the extradition of suspected militants and will amend Swedish and Finnish legislation to toughen the approach to the Kurds. Stoltenberg also said that Sweden and Finland will lift their restrictions on the sale of weapons to Turkey. Finland and Sweden promised not to impose an embargo on the defence industry against Turkey and to take "concrete steps to extradite terrorist criminals”.

    A senior US administration official told Reuters that Turkey had not linked its long-standing request for US F-16 fighter jets to securing the deal. Earlier, the United States banned Turkey from acquiring F-35 fighter jets after Ankara acquired the S-400 missile defence system from Russia in 2017.

    Erdogan said before leaving for Madrid that he would insist on a deal with US President Joe Biden for the supply of F-16 fighter jets. Biden is expected to meet with Erdogan during the summit. According to Western observers, it will still take months for Finland and Sweden to officially join NATO, since their accession to the alliance must be ratified by all individual member states.

    Erdogan's sudden change of position should have good reasons. The obvious ones include the removal from the agenda of the conflict with Washington over the acquisition of the S-400 and certain electoral bonuses - the presidential election in Turkey is in exactly one year, and the lifting of the embargo on the supply of weapons samples.

    The package of economic bonuses belongs to not obvious, but possible ones – inflation remains a serious problem for Turkey, and the national currency has lost half of its value only in recent months. Requesting financial support seems like a logical step. At the same time, Erdogan retains considerable room for manoeuvre. It will take months to ratify the admission of the two countries, and if necessary, Turkey may withdraw its consent if the behaviour of Sweden and Finland – as well as Washington – does not satisfy Ankara's wishes.

    Russia was immediately appointed the main loser by the West. This, of course, would be too hasty and one-sided an assessment. A trilateral agreement can activate many processes in different regions.

    Who will be the new friend of the Kurds

    Turkey is home to 14 million Kurds, making them one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without a homeland. Their 30 million population is scattered across Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, as well as in diasporas around the world. The allies of the Kurds are a very changeable phenomenon, depending on the historical moment, they could include both the United States and Syria, while Iraq and Iran were sometimes listed as opponents.

    The Kurds remain the main guerrilla threat to Turkey, the fight against which Erdogan has largely designated as a priority of his foreign policy.

    At the moment, Turkey is conducting a military operation in the north of Syria and Iraq, the task of which is announced as the creation of a 30-kilometre security zone south of its borders. The Tell Rifaat and Manbij districts will be the first to be "cleansed of terrorists", after which it is possible to spread to the Ayn al-Arab and Ain Issa districts. It is noteworthy that Erdogan stated that the United States supplies weapons to the Kurds – which adds dimensions to the ongoing processes.

    If the EU really fulfils Erdogan's "Kurdish" package of wishes, then the Kurds will look for new friends. This, depending on the current situation, may be Russia, the United States, Syria, Iran, the UAE and many other potential beneficiaries who need an instrument of pressure on Turkey. Given the mass of weapons that were delivered to Ukraine, and then found on the darknet for free sale, it will not be surprising that the Kurds will have modern weapons systems.

    It is not at all necessary that the partnership will be stable and long-lasting. The constant betrayal of the Kurds by their partners has become a sad tradition, which means that Kurdish detachments can conduct a rather chaotic foreign policy.

    Sweden's problems and not only

    The trilateral memorandum will affect the internal political situation in Sweden, where the Kurdish diaspora is quite large and has a certain influence. About 100,000 citizens of Kurdistan live in Sweden. In addition, six members of parliament in Stockholm are of Kurdish origin. The agreement with Turkey removes Sweden from the category of "safe havens" for the Kurds, which is sure to cause a social and political reaction at the levels that are available to the Kurds and their sympathisers.

    The Kurds have already stated that they oppose the very principle of extradition of any political figure, from whatever country they may be. Noting that the implementation of the agreement with Turkey will affect, first of all, the reputation of Sweden and Finland themselves, human rights, freedom, democracy and the entire Swedish society.

    The situation as a whole looks even more unsightly. In fact, the Anglo-Saxon bloc represented by the United States and Great Britain, needing to strengthen its striking fist against Russia, "pushed" through the EU the admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO, during which a whole nation became a bargaining chip. In the same way as the internal policy of the EU and, separately, of the two Nordic countries.

    The admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO finally buries the subjectivity of the EU – if earlier it gave only the economy to Washington, now the European Union has voluntarily deprived itself of security in the northern direction. Russia will inevitably respond to the threat next to itself, and with the use of all available technical means.

    Although the situation with the admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO has moved forward, it will take a long time before these countries officially join the alliance. It is hardly worth waiting for a powerful public reaction in the EU in support of the Kurds, which will force a reconsideration of the decision to admit Sweden and Finland. The weak link here can only be considered Turkey, which has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to rapidly change "categorical" positions.

    However, now a powerful ethnic Kurdish opposition has emerged in the EU, which by and large has nothing to lose. Such a social factor will definitely not add stability to the EU.

    It can be said that “handing over" the Kurds in exchange for Turkey's favour violated the status quo in the Middle East, aggravated the security situation of the EU in the northern direction, forced Russia to develop measures to counter the strengthening of NATO and created a negative social factor in Sweden and Finland. And also confirmed another decline in the EU's authority in the international arena.

    At the same time, Erdogan still has the opportunity to withdraw consent at any time – although it is unlikely that it will be possible to quickly slow down all of the above processes.

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